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A HOLISTIC LOOK AT AGENCY 
ENFORCEMENT* 
DAVID L. MARKELL** & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN*** 
The law review literature has long recognized that effective 
enforcement is an essential component of effective regulation. Yet 
much of the literature focuses on one aspect of the enforcement 
challenge or another. For example, the underlying theory about 
optimal levels of enforcement has received considerable 
attention, as have topics such as the relative merits of using 
deterrence-based versus cooperation-based approaches and the 
use of citizen suits. The purpose of this Article is to consider 
agencies’ enforcement and compliance promotion function 
holistically.  
This Article proposes a three-layered conceptual framework for 
considering options for structuring the administrative agency 
enforcement and compliance promotion function. The first layer 
consists of five components of effective enforcement and 
compliance: norm clarity, norm achievability, verifiability, an 
appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of 
legitimacy. The second involves the interrelated character of these 
components and highlights the importance of fitting each into a 
particular enforcement and compliance regime so that agencies 
may gain synergistic benefits and consider the need to make 
difficult trade-offs. Third, and finally, our conceptual framework 
includes four contextual design issues that create additional 
challenges in determining the appropriate content of each of the 
five key components of effective enforcement and compliance: 
the hybrid character of contemporary governance efforts; the 
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importance of “reality-checking” enforcement options through 
close attention to past performance as well as future challenges 
and opportunities; the dynamic character of environmental 
governance challenges; and the salience of possible design 
changes and the need to prioritize design improvements. This 
Article suggests that it is important to consider all three layers in 
developing an effective enforcement and compliance promotion 
regime. 
This Article tests our conceptual framework by including a case 
study of an ongoing Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
effort to transform its enforcement and compliance promotion 
program and by applying our framework to EPA’s initiative. 
This case study illustrates the value of our framework in 
evaluating regulatory design options for the enforcement and 
compliance promotion function. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law review literature has long recognized that effective 
enforcement is an essential component of effective regulation.1 Yet 
much of the literature focuses on one aspect of the enforcement 
challenge or another. For example, the underlying theory about 
optimal levels of enforcement has received considerable attention,2 as 
have topics such as the relative merits of using deterrence-based 
versus cooperation-based approaches and the use of citizen suits.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a 
“Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4–12 (2000) (citing additional sources). 
 2. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit 
Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 969, 1004–06 (1996); Michael Faure, Effectiveness of 
Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 293, 320–30 (2012); Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 853, 860–61 (2012); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against 
Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 563–64 (1998). Each 
of these sources cites the seminal article on optimal deterrence: Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 3. See generally Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental 
Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985) (discussing “coordination of public and private 
enforcement activities”); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies As Litigation Gatekeepers, 
123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (providing a “systematic account of this often-invoked but 
under-theorized role for agencies” as gatekeepers); Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. 
Earnhart, Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical 
Industry: Deterrence-Based vs. Cooperative Enforcement, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 603 (2007) (discussing the coercive and cooperative approaches to the 
regulator-regulated entity relationship); Joel A. Mintz, Rebuttal: EPA Enforcement and 
the Challenge of Change, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,538 (1996) (defending EPA’s use of a 
deterrence-based approach to regulation); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of 
Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. 
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The purpose of this Article is to consider agencies’ enforcement 
and compliance promotion function holistically. This Article 
approaches the challenge from an “inside-out” perspective,4 a 
perspective that administrative law scholars have found to be lacking 
in the academic literature.5 
 
L. REV. 93 (2005) (addressing the executive’s role in determining private rights of action 
to enforce federal law).  
  We credit Professor Engstrom’s insightful and provocative recent article, supra, 
which seeks to improve regulatory design in this realm, for motivating this effort. 
Professor Engstrom focused on the rationalization of private and public enforcement 
litigation through agency gatekeeping options for private enforcement litigation, both 
conceptually and in the context of specific agencies such as EPA. See id. While we focus 
here on EPA, many of our points are generalizable beyond that agency. We obviously 
bear responsibility for any missteps we may have made in attempting a reformulation and 
quite different elaboration than Engstrom’s of the central challenges of designing an 
apparatus that is responsive to current challenges facing the modern regulatory state in the 
enforcement realm. For insightful syntheses of economists’, political scientists’, and 
management theorists’ perspectives on regulatory design in addressing environmental 
challenges, see, for example, Andrew King & Michael W. Toffel, Self-Regulatory 
Institutions for Solving Environmental Problems: Perspectives and Contributions from the 
Management Literature, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
98, 98 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENT]; Maria Carmen Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental 
Governance and Political Science, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 69, 
69; Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 43, 43. The Canadian Auditor General 
has used a “plan-do-check-improve” model to evaluate management of Environment 
Canada’s enforcement program. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 8 (2011) 
[hereinafter AUDITOR GEN. REPORT], available at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/ 
english/parl_cesd_201112_03_e_36031.html. 
 4. Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative 
Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578, 580–
81, 597–603 (2011) (discussing “inside-out” accountability, which the authors describe as 
“the potential of promoting . . . effective government from inside the bureaucracy”).  
 5. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: 
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 319 (2013) 
(noting the prevalence of “recent calls for bringing an emphasis on inside-out legitimacy”); 
Shapiro & Wright, supra note 4, at 578, 580 (noting that “[a]dministrative law scholarship 
focuses almost exclusively” on controlling agency operations from outside of the agencies 
and observing that, “with only a few exceptions . . . administrative law scholars treat 
agencies as a black box to be controlled from the outside, using political oversight and 
judicial review”). Some legal scholars, of course, have paid close attention to the operation 
of discrete aspects of agency enforcement regimes. See generally JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (rev. ed. 2012) 
(discussing EPA’s enforcement over the course of time); Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing the 
Public Health Aspects of Environmental Enforcement: Qualitative Versus Quantitative 
Evaluations of Enforcement Effort, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 403 (2009) (urging greater reliance on 
qualitative metrics to drive agency enforcement choices); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal 
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999) (discussing welfare-
maximizing strategies to create ideal governance). EPA, among others, has engaged in 
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This Article begins by proposing a three-layered conceptual 
framework for considering options for structuring the administrative 
agency enforcement and compliance promotion function. First, it 
identifies five components of effective regulation both generally and 
in the specific context of regulatory enforcement and compliance: 
norm clarity, norm achievability, compliance verifiability, an 
appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy.6 
 
numerous efforts over the years to develop, revisit, and improve upon agency approaches 
in the enforcement and compliance arena. See generally OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 21E-2001, ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN: 
ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE 1990’S (1991), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/water/owrccatalog.nsf/9da204a4b4406ef885256ae0007a79c7/fbfb51
8793cd84c385256b0600723741!OpenDocument (suggesting ways to enhance EPA’s 
enforcement efforts); James M. Strock, EPA’s Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,327 (1990) (discussing current and future EPA enforcement). EPA is in 
the midst of its latest initiative, which it calls “Next Generation Compliance.” See infra 
Part III. Government interlocutors, scholars, and others have also weighed in on the 
structure of agency enforcement programs and continue to do so. See generally U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-840T, EPA’S EFFORT TO IMPROVE AND 
MAKE MORE CONSISTENT ITS COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (2006), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-840T (discussing the differences in 
enforcement by EPA’s regional offices); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO/RCED-00-108, MORE CONSISTENCY NEEDED AMONG EPA REGIONS IN 
APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT (2000), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00108.pdf 
(discussing variations in EPA regional enforcement); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. E1GAE5-05-0169-7100306, CONSOLIDATED REVIEW OF 
THE AIR ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAMS (1997) (giving 
suggestions on how to improve consistent enforcement); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., 
EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS: HOW EPA AND THE STATES CAN IMPROVE 
THE QUALITY OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE INFORMATION (2001), available at 
http://www.4cleanair.org/epa2001.pdf (suggesting that modernizing data systems would 
improve EPA enforcement). 
  We have also sought to advance thinking in this arena. See generally CLIFFORD 
RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (2003) (analyzing the 
relationship between state and federal agencies); Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. 
Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of 
Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19 (2014) (noting that scholars have failed 
to analyze dimensions and relationships among government authority); Markell, supra 
note 1 (looking at the divide between theoretical deterrence-based enforcement and 
actual enforcement policies and practices); David Markell, EPA Enforcement: A 
Heightened Emphasis on Mitigation Relief, TRENDS (ABA Section of Env’t, Energy, & 
Res.), Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 13 (reviewing a 2012 EPA memorandum entitled “Securing 
Mitigation as Injunctive Relief in Certain Civil Enforcement Settlements”). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. As with virtually all categorization efforts, ours is contestable, 
and alternative characterizations are possible. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 300-F-93-001, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT 1–5 (1992) [hereinafter EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT] (listing 
important components of an effective enforcement program factors such as: (1) 
establishing enforceable requirements; (2) identifying regulated parties; (3) setting 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
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Beyond examining the importance of these components in 
establishing and implementing enforcement and compliance 
promotion policies, we consider some of the complexities involved in 
fitting each component into particular regimes so that agencies may 
take advantage of opportunities to gain synergistic benefits and 
consider the need to make difficult trade-offs. This assessment of how 
each component relates to the others is the second layer in the 
framework we propose.7 
The third layer of our framework for evaluating enforcement and 
compliance promotion functions relates to what we term “contextual 
design challenges.”8 One contextual design issue relates to the hybrid 
character of contemporary governance efforts. As the “new 
 
priorities; (4) promoting compliance; (5) monitoring compliance; (6) responding to 
violations; (7) clarifying roles and responsibilities; and (8) evaluating performance); 
Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 
409, 423–24 (1982) (listing as characteristics of effective regulation clarity and certainty, 
reasonableness and fairness, and efficiency and cost-effectiveness); Joel A. Mintz, 
Assessing National Environmental Enforcement: Some Lessons from the United States’ 
Experience, 26 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2013) (suggesting key components of 
successful environmental enforcement programs); Paul B. Smyth & Milo C. Mason, 
Making Tough Choices Easier: Compliance and Enforcement 102, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Spring 2004, at 3; Meredith James, Note, Results-Based Environmental Regulation 
in Canada: Creative Solution or Re-Branding Regulation?, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 139, 
143 (2009) (identifying effectiveness and efficiency as the usual focus of debates about tool 
selection and including as characteristics of effective regulation “clear, measurable, 
enforceable standards and mandatory language”); cf. Paul Harpur, New Governance and 
the Role of Public and Private Monitoring of Labor Conditions: Sweatshops and China 
Social Compliance for Textile and Apparel Industry, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 49 (2010–
2011) (“Effective regulation has three essential components. First, the law must develop 
standards; second, there must be sufficient monitoring of compliance to detect non-
compliance; and third, there must be some form of motivation to avoid non-compliance.” 
(citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 5 (1982))); Report of the 
Committee on Ethics, 15 ENERGY L.J. 193, 195 (1994) (listing as components of effective 
ethics regulation moral resonance, clarity of purposes, non-triviality, practicality, equity, 
and proportionality). 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. See infra Part I.C. The purpose of identifying these challenges is to provide an 
organizing structure for comparing the merits of alternative ways to design administrative 
programs such as enforcement and compliance inducement programs. For alternative 
conceptualizations, see, for example, Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation 
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 348 
(2004) (providing a framework for a governance model which includes “increased 
participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity and competition, 
decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and 
noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among 
proliferated norm-generating entities”). 
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governance” and other literatures reflect,9 governance is no longer 
the exclusive province of the government, if it ever was, and those 
seeking to design effective regulation should consider the multiplicity 
of actors.10 The capacity of each actor to affect compliance is relevant 
to the desirability of alternative options for the structuring of 
enforcement and compliance programs.11 A second challenge is the 
importance of confronting past performance as well as future 
challenges and opportunities. Past failures to consider performance of 
wide swaths of the regulated community, for example, counsel in 
favor of considering changes to enforcement regimes to account for at 
least the more significant outliers.12 A third design issue stems from 
the dynamic character of governance challenges. As the regulatory 
treatment of the environmental issues posed by climate change 
reflects, normative objectives are likely to be dynamic in some cases.13 
The nature of the tools available to government and other key 
stakeholders also may shift because of factors such as technological 
advances and changes in resource availability. A sharp reduction in 
government enforcement resources, for example, might suggest the 
need to facilitate private enforcement. It is essential to consider these 
dynamic aspects of the regulatory landscape in structuring 
enforcement and compliance efforts. Finally, a fourth critical 
contextual design challenge relates to the salience of possible design 
changes, and the need to prioritize design improvements. Resource 
limitations, for example, limit government enforcement and 
compliance promotion capacity, thus requiring policymakers to 
decide which efforts are the most critical.14 
 
 9. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: 
The Localization of Regulation, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 145, 146–50 (2009) (discussing the 
characteristics of new governance in an environmental context); Lobel, supra note 8, at 
466–70 (describing the goals of new governance as “economic efficiency, political 
legitimacy, and social democracy”). 
 10. See generally Engstrom, supra note 3 (focusing on rationalization of private and 
public enforcement litigation as part of the effort to improve regulatory design). 
 11. See id. at 663–73. 
 12. EPA is attempting such an assessment in its transformation effort, as we discuss in 
more detail in infra Part III. 
 13. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: 
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17, 66–
67 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to 
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2008). See generally Robin Kundis Craig 
& J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1 (2014) (discussing the role of adaptive management in administrative law). 
 14. EPA appears to be at risk of experiencing such reductions. See Sean Reilly, EPA 
Sees Reductions in Enforcement, Inspections Through 2018, FED. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
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This Article also tests our conceptual framework by including a 
case study of an ongoing Environmental Protection Agency effort to 
reform its enforcement and compliance promotion program and by 
applying our framework to EPA’s initiative.15 This case study 
illustrates the potential value of our framework in evaluating 
regulatory design options for the enforcement and compliance 
promotion functions. 
Part I of the Article lays out our conceptual framework. It first 
identifies and examines why each of the five components of effective 
regulation we have identified is important in establishing and 
implementing enforcement and compliance promotion policies.16 
 
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20140221/MGMT05/302240003/EPA-sees-reductions-
enforcement-inspections-through-2018; infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. This Article offers what we hope is a constructive contribution 
to the debate about whether legal scholarship is (in)sufficiently tethered to the real world. 
It attempts to evaluate the real-world practicability of our conception of the manner in 
which the regulatory state operates in light of an agency’s actual practices and procedures. 
For differing views about the value of legal scholarship in terms of the resolution of real-
world challenges, see, for example, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (endorsing 
scholarship that reflects “a healthy balance of theory and doctrine”); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Engaged Scholarship As Method and Vocation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
193, 204 (2010) (urging scholarship that “is both grounded and theoretical, actively 
involved in the world of its subject matter, and for that reason, able to think about it in 
fresh ways”).  
  We are most familiar with EPA and hence have focused on regulatory design 
issues based on that agency’s compliance promotion strategies. Regulatory design is likely 
to be highly dependent on context, but insights from EPA’s enforcement program are 
likely to be particularly valuable more broadly for various reasons, including the agency’s 
extensive experience, accumulated over more than forty years under different pollution 
control statutes, in fostering compliance; the challenges posed by the participation of the 
states in pollution control regimes, which raise federalism issues similar to those facing 
other agencies; and the evolution of the capacities of regulatory stakeholders and of the 
challenges confronting them over time. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of 
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1145 
(2012) (discussing a “unified approach to the design of private enforcement mechanisms 
better tailored to the exigencies of particular regulatory regimes”). 
 16. One could easily compartmentalize the features of the regulatory process 
differently, even if one were to agree with the thrust of our effort. For example, our first 
two categories overlap to some degree, though we think they are sufficiently distinct to 
deserve separate treatment. Similarly, one could separate the carrot- and stick-oriented 
approaches to promoting compliance, which we have combined in our fourth component. 
Additionally, we have not created a separate element to acknowledge the options for self-
regulation that play an increasingly important role. Some might break out fairness as a 
separate component of effective regulation. We think perceptions of fairness (or lack 
thereof) in terms of the distributional effects of regulation affect regulatory legitimacy, 
and we therefore treat fairness as an aspect of legitimacy. Finally, achieving desired results 
is obviously one of the indicia of effectiveness. Our typology is intended to provide a big 
picture sense of different key components of an effective regulatory process. We believe 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
2014] AGENCY ENFORCEMENT 9 
Next, Part I explains why it is important to consider these five 
components holistically in the structure and content of an 
enforcement and compliance program; it is, in our view, of 
foundational importance to consider how the structure and operation 
of each component influences the others. Next, this Part introduces 
the final layer of our multi-layered conceptual framework, which is 
comprised of four contextual design challenges that we believe may 
significantly influence how one should approach design and 
implementation of an effective enforcement and compliance 
promotion regime. 
Part II contextualizes how an agency might begin to consider the 
design of its enforcement and compliance regime by focusing on 
EPA’s track record. This Part examines two especially important 
features of past performance—the adequacy of agency resources and 
the nature of the regulated community—and the implications of 
changes in each feature for the future operation of enforcement and 
compliance programs. This Part helps to ground the Article by 
offering our perspective on EPA’s past enforcement performance and 
some significant challenges and opportunities the agency faces. 
Part III is an attempt to give our framework a test run. It 
provides an overview of an ongoing EPA initiative to transform its 
promotion of compliance with the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) 
regulatory requirements. In this Part, we consider EPA’s ongoing 
transformation effort in light of the conceptual framework introduced 
in Part I and EPA’s track record and anticipated challenges and 
opportunities discussed in Part II. In doing so, we explain how the 
application of our framework would enrich EPA’s analysis of 
available options for restructuring its CWA compliance promotion 
program. In addition to providing insights on EPA’s program, we 
hope our work stimulates analysis of the design and implementation 
of other regulatory programs and, relatedly, demonstrates how the 
context in which a particular program operates is likely to affect the 
manner in which the regulatory components we have identified can 
contribute to (or detract from) effective regulation.17 
 
our framework for integrating the contextual challenges discussed in Part I.C into the 
design of enforcement and compliance programs would remain valuable even if one were 
to define the key components of effective regulation differently than we have. 
 17. For one example of the type of case study that deserves close attention for its 
insights about enforcement and compliance programs, see JOE SCHIEFFELIN ET AL., 
COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, COLORADO’S HAZARDOUS WASTE SMALL 
QUANTITY GENERATOR (SQG) SELF-CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 3 (2013), available at 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/HM_hw-sqg-self-certification-
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
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I.  EFFECTIVE REGULATION: KEY COMPONENTS AND CONTEXTUAL 
DESIGN CHALLENGES 
In designing a regulatory program, policymakers strive, among 
other things, to create mechanisms that are effective in achieving, or 
at least advancing, the program’s goals.18 The relative attractiveness 
of options available to an agency like EPA in structuring and 
implementing its enforcement and compliance promotion function 
may depend on the nature of the regulatory program. Numerous 
models of regulation exist. For example, in the environmental field, 
many commentators characterize traditional regulation as 
“command-and-control.”19 According to Professors Cole and 
Grossman, “ ‘[c]ommand-and-control’ is in essence a regulatory 
approach whereby the government ‘commands’ pollution reductions 
(e.g., by setting emissions standards) and ‘controls’ how these 
reductions are achieved (e.g., through the installation of specific 
pollution-control technologies).”20 Other variations include market-
 
report_0.pdf. Additionally, NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT (LeRoy C. Paddock & Jessica A. Wentz eds., 2014) [hereinafter NEXT 
GENERATION COMPLIANCE], collects descriptions and assessments of recent innovative 
federal and state environmental regulatory enforcement and compliance programs.  
 18. Agency “pathologies” and other factors obviously have the potential to affect 
policymakers’ motivations. See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 674, 680, 684 (discussing 
“bureaucratic behavioral pathologies,” such as agency capture, agency self-
aggrandizement, agencies’ predilections for overly cautious behavior, and the influence of 
careerist incentives of agency personnel, in framing choices among different agency 
gatekeeping options). Although there is debate about the effectiveness of our nation’s 
environmental initiatives, it is well accepted both that there have been some successes and 
that much more remains to be done. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, 
and Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 172 (2010) (noting that “the [CWA] has resulted in significant 
progress in improving the quality of the Nation’s waters”). 
 19. See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in 
Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 465 (1991); David A. Dana, The New 
“Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 43. 
 20. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? 
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory 
Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 887 n.1. This definition is 
misleading for federal environmental mandates that establish performance standards that 
dictate the end result regulated entities must achieve (e.g., a certain level of pollution 
reduction that a regulator determines is achievable using available technology), but not 
the means of achieving those results. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 
RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 151 (2003). Under 
these mandates, regulated entities have at least some discretion to select the means. Id. As 
a result, such regulation neither “commands” nor “controls” the means of compliance. 
Programs that dictate both the ends and the means of compliance are referred to as design 
standards, which are much rarer than performance standards in federal pollution control 
law. See id. at 151–52. But see OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., REP. NO. 
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based approaches to regulation,21 “new governance” approaches,22 
and adaptive regulation.23 Each type of regulation has different 
features and different approaches that may be required for each 
feature to be effective.24 Agencies like EPA may use different types 
of regulation for different challenges, and they may mix and match 
different approaches to address concerns as well.25 
For many types of regulation, enforcement (and compliance with 
regulatory norms more generally) is often characterized as essential 
 
OTA-ENV-634, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE (1995) [hereinafter 
OTA REPORT] (“Of the 30 major pollution control programs established under the Clean 
Air Act, Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, about four 
out of five use design standards . . . .”). As others have pointed out, the term command-
and-control is a pejorative term whose use arose out of an effort by regulated businesses 
to depict environmental regulation as the product of “overregulation, big government, and 
bureaucratic zealotry.” Richard N. L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 
21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 223, 234–35 (2011); see also David M. Driesen & Amy 
Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 76 
(2009) (substituting the term “traditional regulation” for “command-and-control 
regulation” “[t]o avoid confusion and misleading pejorative terminology”). As Cole and 
Grossman point out, critics of traditional regulation have even equated command-and-
control regulation “with ‘Soviet-style’ regulation and ‘socialist central planning,’ implying 
that it is both endemically inefficient and democratically illegitimate.” Cole & Grossman, 
supra, at 887. 
 21. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2012) (establishing an emissions 
trading program to reduce acid rain). 
 22. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 498, 499–501 (2004); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 323, 323 (2009); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515, 2515–16 (2013); Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, 
Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and 
Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 592–93. 
 23. E.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 3–5 (discussing three models of regulation: 
traditional, market-based, and adaptive). The list in the text of available models of 
environmental regulation is not exhaustive. For a succinct review of several types of 
regulation, see generally OTA REPORT, supra note 20. 
 24. See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 20–21 (suggesting that the type of 
regulation used may affect the salience of its attributes); Sally S. Simpson et al., An 
Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control Strategies, 103 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 236–38 (2013) (describing different features of command-and-
control and self-regulation). Definitions of “effectiveness” vary based not only on the 
tools or strategies to be used in a particular regulatory scheme, but also on regulatory 
goals. 
 25. For example, under the CWA, EPA uses all of the types of regulation discussed in 
the text to restrict discharges of pollutants. Among other things, it uses technology-based 
controls and also sets permit limits based on water quality concerns. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 
1313 (2012). In addition, water quality regulators have experimented with effluent trading 
and offset programs. See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, How to Save the Chesapeake Bay TMDL: 
The Critical Role of Nutrient Offsets, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 353 
(2014). 
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to effective regulation,26 although it is not sufficient to achieve desired 
environmental protection policy objectives.27 Moreover, the selection 
of measures to determine the extent of regulatory compliance is 
contestable. The possibilities include inputs (e.g., the extent of agency 
resources invested in bringing enforcement cases), outputs (e.g., the 
number of enforcement actions brought), outcomes (e.g., the amount 
of pollution reductions achieved through enforcement actions), and 
environmental results (e.g., changes in the quality of the ambient air 
or water because of enforcement activity).28 Some consider 
compliance levels to be the Holy Grail of enforcement measures,29 
but such measures have proven extremely difficult to use in practice.30 
 
 26. Congress, regulators, and scholars have all subscribed to this view. See, e.g., EPA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 6, at 1-1 (“Without compliance, 
environmental requirements will not achieve the desired results.”); AUDITOR GEN. 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that the Canadian counterpart to EPA, Environment 
Canada, similarly has concluded that “environmental laws alone are not enough to 
guarantee a cleaner, better environment. These laws also need to be enforced”); Markell, 
supra note 1, at 2–3; see also Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works 
Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 
72 MD. L. REV. 1204, 1207 (2013) (describing “what can be accomplished when a 
regulatory agency and [the Department of Justice] are willing to devote substantial 
resources to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative”); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
185, 189 (“Strong environmental laws are meaningless unless they are effectively 
enforced.”). 
  Some “regulatory” design approaches may not include an enforcement 
component at all or it may be quite remote or understated, such as EPA’s 33/50 strategy. 
For descriptions of that program, see OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. EPA-745-R-99-004, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1 
(1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf; Madhu Khanna & Lisa 
A. Damon, EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic 
Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 2–4 (1999). 
 27. See Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 22, 
23 (“While enforcement is an essential part of EPA’s compliance program, it is not 
realistic to think that enforcement alone will get us to the levels of compliance envisioned 
by our rules.”). 
 28. See, e.g., SHELLEY H. METZENBAUM, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, 
STRATEGIES FOR USING STATE INFORMATION: MEASURING AND IMPROVING STATE 
PERFORMANCE 20–21 (2003), available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/ 
default/files/MeasuringandImprovingPerformance.pdf (summarizing recent emphasis on 
outcome indicators for performance rather than process); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., 
supra note 5, at 11 (“The primary accountability mechanism used by Congress and EPA 
[for the states] has . . . been counting activities that states provide for EPA’s media-specific 
databases, such as numbers of permits, inspections, enforcement actions, and penalty 
dollars.”); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD 
CHOICES 119 (1995) (noting that EPA evaluation of its enforcement work is based on 
numerical indicators). 
 29. See David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 62 (2005) (“Many states, 
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While recognizing that the particular regulatory approach may 
affect the choice of enforcement and compliance promotion 
strategies, at a macro level we suggest that it is possible to identify at 
least five critical components of an effective regulatory enforcement 
and compliance function. Section A below introduces and reviews 
these components. Section B considers some of the complexities 
involved in fitting each of these components into particular regimes, 
including the synergies they provide and the need to make difficult 
trade-offs when they threaten to work at cross-purposes. Section C 
then introduces four challenges that further contextualize the task of 
designing the appropriate structure and content of an agency’s 
enforcement and compliance promotion function. 
A. Five Key Components of Effective Regulation 
Although it is possible to describe the components of effective 
regulation in many ways,31 we think at least five features are relevant 
to the design of a successful regulatory enforcement and compliance 
program: norm clarity, norm achievability, compliance verifiability, an 
appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy, 
as we illustrate in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Components of Effective Regulation 
Norm Clarity 
Norm Achievability 
Verifiability 
The Mix of Rewards and Sanctions
Indicia of Legitimacy 
 
1.  Clarity 
It is axiomatic that it is important to consider the clarity of 
regulatory norms in designing effective regulations.32 There are good 
 
among other parties, have identified compliance rates as one of the best measures (and 
perhaps the best measure) of enforcement performance.”). 
 30. Id. (citing NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 5, at 27) (noting that “the 
calculation of such rates in a credible way is a significant challenge”).  
 31. See supra note 6. 
 32. See, e.g., AUDITOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that a “range of 
activities contributes to compliance . . . , including drafting regulations that are 
enforceable” and further noting that “enforceability . . . depends on a number of factors, 
including clear language and definitions”). 
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reasons for regulators to strive to create clear expectations for 
acceptable (and unacceptable) conduct. It is difficult for a regulated 
entity to comply with its regulatory responsibilities, or for others to 
assess whether it has done so, without understanding what those 
responsibilities are. Participants across the spectrum of interested 
stakeholders recognize the value of establishing clear standards for 
regulated parties to meet. Complaints about indeterminacy are heard 
from regulated parties as well as members of the public.33 The 
government has internalized this message as well, with the head of 
EPA’s enforcement office recently acknowledging that “we should 
focus on greater simplicity and clarity [in our regulations]. One of the 
principles we have learned over years of hard experience is that 
compliance is better when the rules are simple and clear.”34 This 
message is most obviously salient for the development of 
 
 33. At the far end of the continuum are cases such as General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 
F.3d 1324, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which the D.C. Circuit rejected an EPA 
enforcement action because EPA’s rules did not provide sufficiently clear norms. Cf. 
Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (overturning 
agency’s license denial based on lack of clarity in license requirements). Probably more 
typically, lack of clarity leads to delays and increases in transaction costs and may 
discourage socially worthwhile activities. See Angela Morrison Uhland, Improving 
Regulations for Biomass-Based Electrical Generating Facilities, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Summer 2008, at 15, 18. The more likely the possible enforcement, and the more 
burdensome any sanctions assessed would be, the more likely indeterminacy will have 
these effects. 
 34. Giles, supra note 27, at 24; see also Water Quality Standards Regulatory 
Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,517, 54,521 (proposed Sept. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 131) (highlighting the value of “[c]lear regulatory requirements” and 
transparency in promoting water quality protection). Certainty can also help the 
government perform its responsibilities more efficiently and effectively. See, e.g., OFFICE 
OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN 
WATER ACT ACTION PLAN 4 (2009) [hereinafter EPA, CWAP], available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/actionplan101409.pdf (noting that 
EPA’s challenges in protecting water quality have been increased by judicial decisions 
concerning the scope of the CWA’s coverage because the “confusion and uncertainty” 
they created “have negatively impacted EPA’s ability to enforce by significantly increasing 
the amount of time and resources it takes to bring enforcement actions”). Professor Craig, 
addressing this uncertainty, argues that “[l]egal clarity, certainty, and uniformity are 
recognized rule-of-law values, particularly when the law seeks to regulate private 
conduct.” Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The 
Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2011). 
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regulations,35 but it is also important in the development of guidance 
and the exercise of enforcement discretion.36 
Achieving clarity requires attention during multiple stages of the 
regulatory process. An obvious starting point is the regulatory norms 
themselves. A second important aspect of clarity, however, involves 
education, especially education of the regulated community. Studies 
have shown that extra effort to educate regulated parties about their 
legal obligations can pay significant dividends in terms of improved 
compliance.37 A recent Colorado compliance initiative involving 
hazardous waste rules, for example, found that an innovative state 
effort to increase understanding of regulatory requirements led to 
significant improvements in compliance, thereby dramatically 
reducing the need for enforcement.38 
Clarity, however, may also come at a cost. Statutory and 
regulatory schemes often cover a large number of actors, and not all 
are similarly situated. Thus, environmental policymakers often need 
to make choices about whether to use one-size-fits-all approaches or, 
alternatively, to tailor treatment of different sub-groups within the 
 
 35. See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative 
Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 89 (2012) (citing research that 
“demonstrates that certainty in statutory or regulatory mandates increases the likelihood 
of compliance”). 
 36. For an interesting case study about adaptive management theory and suggested 
legal and management reforms to more fully realize the theory’s potential, see generally 
Melissa K. Scanlan & Stephanie Tai, Marginalized Monitoring: Adaptively Managing 
Urban Stormwater, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013). See Elizabeth Glass Geltman 
& Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New American 
Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (1998) (urging creation of a “no action” 
process in which EPA would provide facility-specific guidance “so that it gives industry a 
higher degree of certainty than the EPA’s existing guidance documents and policy 
letters”); Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (and Then 
Some), 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1151, 1156 (2007) (arguing that greater clarity in regulatory 
guidance may be more effective than higher penalties in reducing undesirable activities 
concerning health care insurance); cf. Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory 
Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 703 (2014) 
(arguing that “not all uncertainty is created equal”).  
 37. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. EPA 305-F-09-001, INCREASING 
UNDERSTANDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS IS THE HEART OF EPA 
ASSISTANCE (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/ 
assistance/08cafactsheet.pdf (describing successful education programs which reduced 
emissions from paint stripping and coating operations and partnerships between EPA and 
states to increase understanding of industry best waste management practices); OFFICE OF 
ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. EPA 300-R-
02-003, THE NATIONAL NITRATE COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 19–21 (2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/civil/programs/nitrate.pdf 
(describing a compliance assistance initiative involving the metal finishing sector). 
 38. See SCHIEFFELIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 18. 
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regulated community. In some situations it is possible to use fairly 
bright lines for such tailoring. The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act’s (“RCRA”) use of thresholds to distinguish between 
standard generators and de minimis generators is an example.39 
Sometimes, however, efforts to regulate “fairly” require much more 
ad hoc judgments about whether particular members of the regulated 
community qualify for special treatment. Especially in the latter 
situations, where there are no bright-line rules or tests, there is a clear 
tension between clarity and “fair” treatment.40 
Regardless of the precise weight policymakers and others attach 
to clarity as a component of effective regulation in a particular 
context, it seems relatively uncontested that clarity of norms and 
expectations is a factor that at a minimum deserves attention in 
regulatory design.41 
2.  Achievability 
A second key component of effective regulation is its capacity to 
achieve (including the agency’s ability to effectively implement) 
regulatory requirements. Using EPA’s terminology, achievability 
involves the extent to which strategies “will work in the real world—
rules with compliance built in.”42 A recent example of EPA’s 
emphasis on achievability in developing a particular regulatory 
regime relates to the agency’s proposal of emission control 
regulations for oil and gas producers under the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”). EPA adopted the strategy of allowing producers simply to 
inform EPA that they are using air pollution control equipment that 
EPA has certified rather than testing the equipment themselves. EPA 
 
 39. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (2013) (describing conditional exemption for small quantity 
waste generators). RCRA is the principal federal statute governing the management of 
solid and hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012). 
 40. Some of the waiver provisions under the CWA are examples of regulations that 
require ad hoc judgments. On the potential benefits of making case-by-case adjustments to 
regulations after adoption, including through the enforcement process, see generally 
Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental 
Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004). 
 41. The rule of lenity is a canon of construction that highlights the value courts have 
attached to clarity, particularly in criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336, 347–49 (1971); see also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681–82 (1988) 
(highlighting the benefits of a bright line rule which provides “ ‘clear and unequivocal’ 
guidelines to the law enforcement profession”). 
 42. Giles, supra note 27, at 23. For arguments in favor of pragmatic regulatory 
approaches, see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 20, at ix–xii. There is obviously an 
overlap between this second attribute and clarity in that clear rules may be easier to 
achieve than unclear ones. 
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explained that its purpose in using this approach was to “make 
compliance easier and less costly, while improving results . . . .”43 
Achievability has not always trumped other values in policy 
design. Congress has insisted that regulatory standards be set with 
little if any attention given to achievability because of the weight it 
attached to other values, such as attaining a particular level of health 
or environmental protection. In the environmental laws, for example, 
Congress in some cases has directed EPA not to consider costs in 
developing regulatory standards.44 In other regulatory schemes, 
Congress did not prohibit consideration of cost, but nevertheless 
made it clear that it was permissible for EPA to attach relatively little 
weight to it, and apply a relatively loose definition of achievability.45 
At least in some contexts, technology-forcing regulatory approaches 
have been used successfully to substantially improve normatively 
desired outcomes notwithstanding questions at the outset about the 
achievability of such approaches.46 
Independent of any particular regime, scholars have debated the 
value of including hortatory language in environmental statutes 
because of the gap between objectives and likely results. Some 
 
 43. Giles, supra note 27, at 23. We do not mean to suggest that self-reporting without 
agency oversight would necessarily be appropriate. See, e.g., SCHIEFFELIN ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 3 (noting that self-reporting in tandem with agency oversight helped to improve 
compliance). Instead, allowing regulated entities to certify that they have used technology 
EPA itself has approved, subject to verification by the agency that the certification is 
accurate, is more efficient than requiring regulated entities to retest the efficacy of the 
technology. 
 44. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (holding that 
the CAA prohibits EPA from considering cost in setting national ambient air quality 
standards). 
 45. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 260 (1976) (“ ‘Therefore, the 
Committee determined that existing sources of [air] pollutants either should meet the 
standard of the law or be closed down . . . .’ ”(quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 2–3 (1970))); 
Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 808–09 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that 
Congress adopted stringent technology-based regulations under the CWA that might put 
some regulated sources out of business). 
 46. Technology-forcing regulation has long been an accepted and important tool for 
achieving environmental goals. Aspirational regulations have prompted technological 
developments that facilitated improved performance, sometimes in the face of infeasibility 
claims. See Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance to Climate Change: A 
Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 83, 89–90 
(David M. Driesen ed., 2010); Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in 
Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 955–58 (1994); Daniel P. Selmi, 
Impacts of Air Quality Regulation on Economic Development, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 382, 386 (1998) (“In the past, claims that the pollution control technology is 
impossible to achieve have collapsed when one manufacturer announced that it was able 
to comply.”). 
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suggest that setting the bar high has had a positive influence on 
performance.47 Others have been more skeptical.48 Regardless of the 
weight that should be attached to achievability in the design of any 
particular regulatory regime, the larger, conceptual point is that, 
when developing regulatory approaches, it is important to consider 
the extent to which regulated parties are likely to achieve regulatory 
standards. 
3.  Verifiability 
A third key component of effective regulation and of strategies 
to induce compliance involves what we term “verifiability.” We 
define verifiability as the capacity to monitor compliance with 
regulatory requirements.49 There is little question that the ability to 
monitor compliance with legal requirements is a critical component of 
effective regulation.50 
 
 47. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, 
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 150 (2004) 
(noting that many environmental laws with aspirational objectives “have arguably forced 
much beneficial technological and social change”). 
 48. Compare Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-
in Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 326–27 (2012) (raising the possibility that 
renewable portfolio standards have operated as “political subterfuges: symbolic legislation 
adopted to garner electoral favor but intended to accomplish very little in actuality”), John 
P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 300 (1990) 
(“Symbolic legislation is not a set of specific instructions for the agency to follow, but a 
statement of legislative aspirations and assurances delivered to various constituencies as 
well as the agency.”), and Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: 
Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 446–58 
(1999) (discussing juxtaposition between the “perceived political benefit of being viewed 
as doing something” and the potentially “disastrous [political] consequences of actually 
doing something”), with Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The 
Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 119 (2006) 
(noting the instrumental value of symbolic legislation, which can “function as a ‘thumb on 
the scale’ in favor of more rather than less pollution control. [Such] symbolism, though 
imperfect, is a rational legislative approach to states’ and industries’ persistent resistance 
to cleaning the air”). 
 49. Cf. Dmitry Kahrshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process 
Elements and Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 110 (2011) (defining verifiability as “the ability of a follow-on 
researcher to confirm that he or she has successfully reproduced the original 
experiment”). 
 50. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-21, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: EPA CANNOT ENSURE THE ACCURACY OF SELF-
REPORTED COMPLIANCE MONITORING DATA 15 (1993), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-93-21 (describing an initiative to identify hazardous 
waste programs operating without self-reporting as “vital to the integrity of the regulatory 
system”); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. NO. 13-P-0373, THE 
EPA SHOULD IMPROVE MONITORING OF CONTROLS IN THE RENEWABLE FUEL 
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The major federal environmental regulatory statutes generally 
provide broad monitoring authority that includes, at a minimum, 
authority for the government to inspect an operation’s compliance 
with regulatory requirements, as well as an obligation for the 
regulated party to monitor its own performance.51 Yet, monitoring 
schemes come in various shapes and sizes.52 For example, New York 
implemented a statewide strategy that sought to enhance verifiability 
by requiring facilities with especially significant compliance concerns 
to hire independent third-party monitors whose role was to 
complement both government inspection efforts and the facility’s own 
compliance efforts.53 
As a practical matter, the nature and extent of monitoring that 
occurs is likely to depend on a variety of features of the particular 
regulatory regime involved, including the availability of government 
resources; the complexity associated with monitoring compliance and 
 
STANDARD PROGRAM 6 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/ 
2013/20130905-13-P-0373.pdf (recommending additional monitoring to verify that 
participants comply with regulations and to avoid fraud cases); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. NO. 2005-P-00004, EPA NEEDS TO DIRECT MORE 
ATTENTION, EFFORTS, AND FUNDING TO ENHANCE ITS SPECIATION MONITORING 
PROGRAM FOR MEASURING FINE PARTICULATE MATTER (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050207-2005-P-00004.pdf (describing the EPA’s 
speciation monitoring network as a “critical component” for developing control 
strategies); AUDITOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
 51. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2012) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (2012) (RCRA); 42 
U.S.C. § 7414 (2012) (CAA). 
 52. Monitoring can take several forms, such as the requirement that regulated entities 
file periodic discharge monitoring reports (“DMRs”) under the CWA, see 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 122.2 (defining DMRs), 122.41(l)(4)(i), or the obligation for industrial facilities to 
report annual chemical releases under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act, see Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/ 
toxics-release-inventory-tri-program (last updated Nov. 4, 2014). DMRs are compliance-
based, while chemical release forms are not strictly so but can indirectly assist 
environmental performance generally and compliance in particular. Verifiability tools vary 
in their degree of transparency. 
 53. See David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our 
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental 
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 407–08 (1994). Other approaches to monitoring include: 
reward systems, see, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON. AND INNOVATION, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, NO. EPA 240-B-05-003, PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.epeat.net/documents/EPEATreferences/EPA_PT_Prog_guide.pdf; 
compliance incentives, see, e.g., Memorandum from Steve Herman, Assistant Adm’r, to 
Office of Enforcement & Compliance, Envtl. Prot. Agency Attach. 1, at 3, (Nov. 27, 1996), 
available at http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/DigitalLibrary/AdminHistories/Box% 
20021-030/Box%20025/1227951-environmental-protection-agency-12.pdf; and spotlighting 
and information dissemination, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and 
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 617–19 (1999). 
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the training required to monitor credibly; the availability, cost, and 
reliability of monitoring equipment; the trustworthiness of regulated 
parties and their commitment to self-monitoring; and the capacity of 
non-governmental interests to participate in monitoring. 
Some commentators have highlighted the importance of broader 
transparency to the public as an aspect of verifiability.54 Transparency 
can be enhanced in a variety of ways. For example, the CWA requires 
permittees to submit discharge monitoring reports (“DMRs”) that 
demonstrate compliance or noncompliance with legal requirements 
and, in addition, requires that these DMRs be easily accessible to 
interested citizens.55 The transparency of the CWA in revealing 
noncompliance is a principal reason why most of the citizen suit 
activity against alleged violators of major environmental laws has 
occurred under that statute.56 Other reporting requirements, such as 
those for hazardous substance releases above a reportable quantity,57 
or pursuant to EPA’s toxics release inventory (“TRI”) program,58 are 
useful for monitoring and verifying compliance with legal 
requirements while also serving other purposes.59 
 
 54. See Markell, supra note 29, at 8–10 (discussing increases in transparency and 
public involvement). EPA’s view on transparency, as expressed by its Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance assistant administrator, Cynthia Giles, is that 
“[p]ublic disclosure is [an] underutilized tool; there is powerful evidence that publishing 
information about company performance drives better behavior, as pressure is applied by 
customers, neighbors, investors, and insurers.” Giles, supra note 27, at 24. Further, Giles 
indicates that transparency may serve a “reminder function” by drawing attention to 
problems and inducing senior-level officials to fix them. Id. at 25. Transparency may also 
bring community pressure to bear on lower performing parties by alerting investors and 
insurers to noncompliance in ways that provide financial motivation to improve 
performance. Id. at 25–26. 
 55. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW 
AND POLICY 971 (6th ed. 2011). 
 56. See William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the 
Clean Water Act, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 75 (2007) [hereinafter Andreen, Motivating 
Enforcement] (reporting that environmental organizations brought hundreds of CWA 
cases during the Reagan administration when federal enforcement flagged); James R. 
May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2003) (noting that most environmental citizen suits between 1978 and 1983 were 
filed under the CWA, although suits were distributed more evenly in later years); 
Catherine Mongeon, Note, Environmental Conservation Organization v. City of Dallas 
Creates Unnecessary Burdens for Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 36 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 237, 240 (2009) (noting that the CWA is more prevalently used in citizen suits 
because its record-keeping requirements create broader transparency). 
 57. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012) (reporting requirement). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2012). 
 59. See David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for 
Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 1, 33 n.86 
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Considerable evidence shows that in many circumstances 
inadequate verification contributes to lower-than-desired levels of 
compliance with environmental requirements. To offer an example 
from international environmental law, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (“CDM”) has suffered from weak 
verifiability, which has undermined the Mechanism’s effectiveness.60 
The Canadian Auditor General similarly found that monitoring 
shortcomings weakened the enforcement and compliance 
performance of a Canadian environmental program.61 On the other 
hand, enhanced reporting has led to dramatically improved 
compliance in some cases. In a recent article, EPA’s Assistant 
Administrator for Enforcement highlighted a 2008 study in 
Massachusetts that found that requiring drinking water systems to 
mail compliance information to customers reduced both 
environmental regulatory violations and severe health violations 
significantly.62 She noted that “EPA’s efforts to make our data more 
available are only starting to scratch the surface of the ways 
transparency can improve results.”63 
In short, while the optimal parameters for incorporating a 
verification component into a particular regulatory regime will 
depend on a wide variety of factors, the literature demonstrates that 
verification is a foundational element of an effective regulatory 
scheme. 
4.  The Mix of Rewards and Sanctions 
A fourth component of an effective regulatory scheme is its 
capacity to incentivize regulated parties to comply with regulatory 
obligations through the use of both carrots and sticks. Conceptually, 
 
(1993) (citing Charles L. Elkins, Toxic Chemicals, the Right Response, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 1988, at F3 (stating that the TRI program revealed the extent to which companies were 
discharging potentially harmful substances, both through accidents and routine daily 
operations)).  
 60. See, e.g., Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 121 (2014) (“The CDM has suffered serious 
[verifiability] problems. Determining whether emissions have actually increased is easy if 
you have continuous and automatic emissions monitoring that can be verified. In a 
developing country where one relies upon records that may not exist, and testing 
technology that may be inadequate or fraudulent, it can be difficult if not impossible.”). 
 61. AUDITOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
 62. Giles, supra note 27, at 25. 
 63. Id. 
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an optimal level of compliance maximizes net social benefits.64 
Strategies that embody a mix of rewards and sanctions have the 
potential to contribute to achieving desired compliance levels. 
EPA, on its own and in tandem with environmental or 
community non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and regulated 
parties, has a rich array of options for promoting compliance.65 These 
include litigation options such as criminal prosecutions under many of 
the environmental statutes, civil judicial actions, and administrative 
enforcement actions, some of which may, like their judicial 
counterparts, seek penalties and other relief.66 Beyond these types of 
formal enforcement litigation, EPA uses strategies that employ 
“carrots,” or a mix of “carrots and sticks,” to promote compliance.67 
 
 64. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 316 (1999); see 
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630 & n.37 (citing Becker, supra note 2, at 200, as the source of 
“the classic account of optimal deterrence in which sanctions are set equal to the net social 
cost of undesirable conduct divided by the probability of successful prosecution, such that 
a wrongdoer internalizes the full social cost of her action”). 
 65. Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence and 
Experience Say Yes, but We Need to Understand How and Why, in 1 MAKING LAW WORK: 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 379, 384 (Durwood 
Zaelke et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter MAKING LAW WORK] (describing actions EPA can 
use, including civil and criminal enforcement, penalties, injunctive relief, public 
notification of violations, and varying incentives). Following up to assess whether alleged 
violators return to compliance is another aspect of enforcement. See AUDITOR GEN. 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
 66. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2012) (RCRA); 42 
U.S.C. § 7413 (2012) (CAA). 
 67. See ROBERT ESWORTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34384, FEDERAL 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS: HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED? 19 (2013) [hereinafter 
ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?], available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RL34384.pdf (noting that EPA uses a diverse set of strategies to promote 
compliance, including compliance assistance, administrative and civil enforcement, and 
criminal enforcement); Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and 
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,618–19 (Apr. 11, 2000); ENVTL. LAW 
INST., BEYOND ENFORCEMENT? ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, AND 
CORPORATE LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS IN FIVE MIDWEST STATES 1–2 (2003), available at 
http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d13-01c.pdf (listing a mixture of compliance 
tools, including both incentives and penalties, that organizations use to promote and 
achieve compliance with environmental regulations); Lyon, supra note 3, at 49–52 
(discussing the impacts of alternative policy instruments, such as subsidies and effluent 
fees). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) experimented with 
an apparently successful program under which it promised less frequent inspections of 
plants with poor safety records if operators voluntarily agreed to improve working 
conditions and monitor and report on their progress. A court invalidated the program, 
however, based on the agency’s procedural violations in adopting it. See Mark Seidenfeld, 
An Apology for Administrative Law in The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 
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An active debate continues about the relative effectiveness of various 
enforcement strategies in different contexts.68 
At the ground level, EPA has developed a library full of 
enforcement response and penalty policies that seek to prioritize 
violations that warrant different levels of enforcement attention.69 
The agency has generally attempted to focus on “significant 
violations” and “high priority” violations, while giving less or 
different types of attention to minor instances of noncompliance.70 It 
has also developed a substantial set of compliance promotion and 
incentive policies that reflect a mix of strategies.71 In short, effective 
 
218 n.12 (2000) (citing Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 
(D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 68. Compare Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of 
Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,245, 10,247–50 (2000) 
(discussing the deterrent effects of compliance inspections, criminal sanctions, self-
regulatory efforts, and information disclosure), with Silberman, supra note 65, at 386–91 
(evaluating the deterrent effects of civil and criminal penalties, informal enforcement by 
market forces, and conditional government benefits and theorizing that communication 
about and visibility of the consequences of noncompliance would increase their deterrent 
effect), and Simpson et al., supra note 24, at 233–34 (noting that, while studies have been 
conducted on effective deterrence through government regulation, scholars and 
policymakers know little about the effectiveness of different corporate crime-control 
strategies associated with self-regulation). 
 69. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, WORKBOOK: THE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE (T&A) ENFORCEMENT 
RESPONSE TO HIGH PRIORITY VIOLATIONS (HPVS) 1-1 (1999), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3artd/enforce/mainenf/wrkbkv2.pdf; Memorandum from 
Rosemarie A. Kelley, Dir., Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, to Reg’l 
Counsels, Div. Dirs., and Reg’l Enforcement Dirs. Attach. C (Apr. 6, 2010), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/revision-adjusted-penalty-policy-matrices-package-
issued-november-16-2009 (providing updated gravity-based penalty matrices for violations 
of RCRA); Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Office of 
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, to Reg’l Counsel, Regions 1-10 and Div. Dirs., 
Envtl. Prot. Agency Attach. 1, at 1–2 (June 23, 2003), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-civil-
penalty-policy (revising RCRA’s penalty policy to include penalty adjustments based on 
the gravity of the violation). For current EPA efforts to revisit CWA enforcement 
strategies, see infra Part III. 
 70. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, 
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2010) (“The 
EPA emphasizes cases involving significant harm in its policy regarding the exercise of 
investigative discretion.”); Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Adm’r, 
Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, to Water Mgmt. Div. Dirs. and Reg’l 
Counsels 1 (Sept. 21, 1995), available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/memorandum-
revision-npdes-significant-noncompliance-snc-criteria-address-violations-non (Revision of 
NPDES Significant Noncompliance (SNC) Criteria to Address Violations of Non-Monthly 
Average Limits). 
 71. See, e.g., Compliance Assistance, EPA.GOV (June 20, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/assistance/index.html. 
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compliance promotion is most likely to derive from the use of a 
combination of traditional enforcement activity, facilitated by robust 
monitoring and reporting regimes, and efforts to induce regulated 
entities to comply through financial and other positive and negative 
incentives. Determinations of how best to combine those elements 
will inevitably be context specific. 
5.  Legitimacy 
Finally, we suggest that an important component of effective 
regulation is its capacity to promote legitimacy, which we define to 
include enhancing confidence of the public and others.72 We believe 
that, in designing and implementing regulatory enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms, it is appropriate for policymakers to ask 
whether a particular regulatory design will enhance or diminish public 
confidence in the government’s ability and willingness to promote 
compliance with it. A regulatory scheme that leads to a public 
perception that government is corrupt, overbearing, or selective in its 
enforcement of the law may lead to a loss of confidence and trust that 
undermines effective regulation in many ways, including by 
exacerbating budget pressures if public support for necessary funding 
diminishes.73 As one of us has noted elsewhere, “[t]he legitimacy of a 
 
 72. For efforts to raise this fifth feature of effective regulation in different contexts, 
see generally Hammond & Markell, supra note 5 (discussing the potential of “inside-out” 
strategies to foster legitimacy); John H. Knox & David L. Markell, Evaluating Citizen 
Petition Procedures: Lessons from an Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 
47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 505 (2011) (discussing the NAFTA Environmental Commission’s 
citizen petition process as an example of a government program emphasizing increased 
legitimacy through citizen involvement and transparency). For discussions of the difficult-
to-define concept of legitimacy, see, for example, Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & 
Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for 
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 466 (2012) (noting that “[l]egitimacy is a 
notoriously treacherous concept”). One way to define legitimacy is to focus on “the 
acceptability of [a] regulation to those involved in its development.” Jody Freeman & 
Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 60, 63 (2000). Such acceptability may hinge on the availability of opportunities for 
public participation and the degree of regulatory transparency. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, 
A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN 
GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 59 n.345 (2011) (“Public participation and transparency are widely 
considered to be the backbone of legitimacy for public agencies.”); Durwood Zaelke, 
Matthew Stilwell & Oran Young, What Reason Demands: Making Law Work for 
Sustainable Development, in MAKING LAW WORK, supra note 65, at 42 (describing 
elements of good governance for sustainable development as including anti-corruption 
and accountability). 
 73. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), in which landowners challenged an EPA 
order requiring them to apply for a dredge and fill permit under the CWA before 
developing portions of their land alleged to contain wetlands, may be an example of lack 
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regulatory system also [may] turn[] on the degree to which it protects 
against deviation from legislative goals due to capture of regulators 
by special interests,” and on whether decisionmakers are perceived as 
honest, unbiased, or competent.74 Polling results showing the 
American public’s loss of confidence in the federal government 
highlights the salience of perception by different audiences and 
constituencies in designing the enforcement aspects of regulatory 
programs.75 
B. Interrelatedness of the Five Components of Effective Regulation 
The preceding section introduces what we believe to be five 
important components of effective regulation.76 Considering each of 
these components on its own merits is, we submit, a starting point in 
designing and implementing an effective enforcement and compliance 
promotion regime. A second layer of analysis involves assessing how 
the relationships among the components affect the manner in which, 
and the degree to which, policymakers should pursue each individual 
component of effective regulation. This section focuses on the 
fundamentally interrelated character of different components of the 
 
of buy-in by some citizens to regulatory goals or means. See id. at 1370–72; Rachel E. 
Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 
VA. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2013) (raising concerns about unfettered prosecutorial 
discretion); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing fairness as a 
component of legitimacy). The controversy concerning the IRS’s purported selection bias 
in targeting “tea party” groups is another recent example. See Sheila Krumholz & Robert 
Weinberger, Op-Ed., The Real I.R.S. Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2013, at A27 (noting 
long-term damage to IRS credibility in assessing claims of tax-exempt status that “will be 
difficult to undo”). 
 74. See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 30. 
 75. See, e.g., Joy Wilke & Frank Newport, Fewer Americans than Ever Trust Gov’t to 
Handle Problems, GALLUP POLITICS (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
164393/fewer-americans-ever-trust-gov-handle-problems.aspx. Some individual agencies, 
including EPA, tend to poll much higher, however. At the same time that only nineteen 
percent of respondents in one poll answered that they trust the government to do what is 
right almost always or most of the time, and only twenty-three percent viewed Congress 
favorably, sixty-two percent of respondents viewed EPA favorably. PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT NEARS RECORD LOW, BUT MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE 
VIEWED FAVORABLY 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/10-18-13%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf. 
 76. A recent Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) report notes that 
“[c]ompliance with pollution control laws is addressed through a continuum of response 
mechanisms, ranging from compliance assistance to administrative and civil enforcement, 
to the stronger criminal enforcement.” ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra 
note 67, at 19. In the previous section, we suggest that the continuum is even broader than 
the report suggests, reaching at least as far back as the initial adoption of regulatory 
requirements. 
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regulatory process in order to reinforce the importance of considering 
regulatory design holistically rather than atomistically. 
The five components of effective enforcement and compliance 
that we discuss above are interrelated in a virtually unlimited number 
of ways. We offer a few illustrations in this section. Our first example 
relates to concerns that arose in 2007 about compliance rates among 
small quantity generators (“SQGs”) of hazardous waste under 
Colorado’s hazardous waste program.77 As backdrop, state regulators 
believed that SQGs in the state might collectively pose a greater risk 
to human health and the environment than other, larger generators.78 
This was because in the aggregate SQGs generated a considerable 
amount of waste; they did so at many more locations than large 
quantity generators; and the SQGs had less control over the waste 
and lower levels of compliance.79 Because of resource constraints, 
agency staff members were only able to inspect each SQG once every 
eight years. In the agency’s view, “[t]hat [was] simply not enough to 
improve compliance”—“[t]he 12 percent inspection coverage we were 
attaining each year did not create enough accountability and 
deterrence to improve compliance rates.”80 
Colorado decided it needed to address the SQG sector in a 
different way.81 It adopted a regulation that sought to improve 
compliance by changing the “verifiability” component and enhancing 
the clarity of the regulatory requirements. In particular, the State 
required that each SQG complete and return a “self-certification 
checklist” to the agency.82 Failure to do so subjected a SQG to an 
enforcement action and the possibility of penalties.83 Colorado 
reports that the return rate for the checklists was more than ninety-
five percent.84 
Beyond tweaking the verifiability component of its regulatory 
scheme, Colorado also invested considerable effort in improving the 
scheme’s clarity. The state prepared a comprehensive compliance 
checklist that identified all of the regulatory requirements, and it 
developed an instruction booklet that provided guidance on how to 
 
 77. This summary of the Colorado program is taken from SCHIEFFELIN ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 4–5. 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. See id. at 4–5. 
 80. Id. at 4. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. Id. at 3. 
 83. Id. at 5. 
 84. Id. 
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complete each question on the checklist.85 The state sent the checklist 
and instruction booklet to all members of the regulated community.86 
The changes to verifiability, sanctions, and clarity led to 
significant increases in compliance. As the report on the initiative 
reflects, “compliance rates across the SQG sector have dramatically 
improved. . . In 2008, only 32 percent of the SQGs were in compliance 
with 100 percent of the regulatory requirements. . . . By 2011, the 
compliance rate had increased to 84 percent.”87 This example reflects 
the value of thinking about key components of a compliance 
promotion scheme in an integrated way and appears to be an example 
of a significant redesign that yielded impressive improvements in 
performance. 
A second example of the value of approaching the different 
components of regulation in an integrated fashion is not as grounded 
in a real-world effort to improve environmental compliance. In a 
recent article, Professor David Freeman Engstrom focuses on one 
aspect of enforcement—enforcement litigation, and, in particular 
private and public enforcement litigation—in an effort to improve 
regulatory design.88 Engstrom considers whether agency 
“gatekeeping” of private enforcement, which involves an agency’s 
exercise of statutory authority to block or otherwise influence private 
enforcement actions, would help to rationalize enforcement litigation; 
he further considers the possible options for designing such a 
gatekeeping function.89 
For example, Engstrom suggests that a strong agency 
gatekeeping role to limit or direct private enforcement might be 
appropriate when there is a significant risk that private enforcement 
will yield legislative drift “as private enforcers drive law enforcement 
efforts in new and democratically unaccountable directions.”90 It 
seems reasonable to conclude that the clearer the substantive rules 
that govern the conduct of regulated entities, the lower the risk that 
courts, responding to suits by NGOs, will accept novel applications of 
legal mandates that amount to such legislative drift. Under these 
circumstances, all other things being equal, the need for agencies to 
exercise veto authority over private enforcement efforts should 
 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 619–25. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 638. 
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recede. On the other hand, in some cases, clear requirements may 
contribute to dramatic reductions in noncompliance and hence in the 
need for enforcement, private or public. The value of private 
enforcement may decline in such circumstances, which might affect 
analysis of the desired mix of rewards and sanctions and, in particular, 
the appropriateness of incorporating a private enforcement feature in 
a compliance program. 
The ability of regulated entities to comply with regulatory norms 
(the achievability component) is also salient in considering the 
desirability and structure of Engstrom’s gatekeeping apparatus as 
part of a regulatory scheme’s sanctions function. If compliance is 
particularly difficult, public enforcers might choose to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion and defer prosecution of known violations, or 
reduce the penalties assessed for such violations, perhaps in return for 
commitments by regulated entities to sink resources into developing a 
fix for the implementation problem.91 A gatekeeper regime that 
empowered NGOs to initiate private enforcement actions might 
interfere with commitments that regulated entities might otherwise 
make to public enforcers.92 In circumstances in which achievability is 
a concern, the arguments in favor of a strong public gatekeeping role 
for private enforcement actions may be relatively appealing.93 On the 
other hand, problems with achievability may create more, and more 
significant, noncompliance problems that may overwhelm public 
enforcement capacity. The incorporation of private enforcement 
litigation as a component of an enforcement regime would seem to 
hold special value in such cases.94 
Consideration of Professor Engstrom’s gatekeeping scenario also 
shows that verifiability is not only a critical feature of regulation in its 
own right but is also important because of its effect on other 
 
 91. EPA engages in this practice frequently. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, 
Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1327, 1330–34 (2004) (describing EPA’s flexible and pragmatic approach to 
enforcement, including reliance on investment by regulated entities in supplemental 
environmental projects). 
 92. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental 
Citizen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC 
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 105, 117 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992); 
Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 
375–76 (1990). 
 93. See supra Part I.A.4 (discussing gatekeeping as part of the mix of rewards and 
sanctions component of effective regulation). 
 94. This was Congress’s reasoning in including a citizen suit provision in the CWA. 
See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). 
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components of regulatory compliance design. Easy and cheap access 
by private enforcers to information revealing compliance status 
creates a risk of over-deterrence, at least if one regards what 
Professor Engstrom refers to as the “zealousness critique” of private 
enforcement95 as a significant concern. If access to information 
concerning compliance status is available at little or no cost, private 
enforcers may pursue actions in which their expected return on 
investment in litigation will exceed their costs, even if public enforcers 
would choose not to sue because the expected social cost exceeds the 
expected social gain. Thus, low verification costs may increase the risk 
that public and private assessments of the relative costs and value of 
enforcement diverge, resulting in over-expenditure of social resources 
and over-deterrence.96 
The likelihood of overzealousness remains in dispute, however, 
and gatekeeping regimes may be structured to minimize it (if, indeed, 
they are needed at all).97 For example, the absence of a damage 
remedy for successful private enforcers under the citizen suit 
provisions of the federal environmental statutes should minimize this 
risk. Likewise, these provisions all require that penalties be paid to 
the United States Treasury, not to private enforcers.98 Further, some 
scholars, such as Professor Barton Thompson, have suggested that 
“the benefits of citizen suits have far outstripped the benefits that 
 
 95. Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630–34 (suggesting that private enforcers may be 
overzealous because their motivations may differ from the goal of maximizing social 
welfare). Engstrom is not alone in identifying the hazards of reliance on private 
enforcement. See, e.g., Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding 
Role of Non-State Actors in the Regulatory Process, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 114, 119 
(2013) (noting concerns about private regulatory failure, lack of accountability, and 
private overzealousness). As Grabosky colorfully puts it, “[T]he sword of citizen 
participation is two-edged. One would not wish to see the advent of wiki witch hunts.” Id.; 
see also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 685–90 (1999) (discussing the negative effects and need for regulation 
of “availability cascades”). 
 96. See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630–31; see also Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights 
of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11, 25 (2014) (describing this problem in connection 
with implied private rights of action); id. at 46 (“[F]inancial incentives may play an 
important role in the decision to sue, which can lead to excessive litigation and 
overdeterrence.”); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1343 (2008) (arguing that, under the securities laws, private 
enforcers’ “profit motive is inherently misaligned with the public’s interest in achieving 
optimal deterrence”). 
 97. See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 3, at 631 (discussing the zealousness critique). 
 98. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), 1365(a) (2012). 
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Congress originally identified,”99 even assuming that some over-
deterrence occurs. These suits create the potential for private 
enforcers to create enforcement innovations that may be attractive to 
public enforcers, promote democratic values that direct citizen 
participation in law enforcement yields, and serve an educational 
function.100 The larger point still stands, however: the design of the 
verifiability component of effective regulation affects how other 
aspects of environmental regulation should be structured, including 
the appropriate mix of rewards and sanctions. 
A final reflection on the integrated character of different 
components of effective environmental regulation involves the 
relationship between the mix of sanctions and rewards with legitimacy 
and is again illustrated in connection with the desirability of a 
gatekeeping mechanism. A regulatory design that gives a government 
agency extremely powerful gatekeeping authority might undermine 
legitimacy if the public’s perception is that an agency is choking off 
much-needed private enforcement.101 Such a loss of legitimacy is most 
likely to be the case if an agency is widely perceived as corrupt or 
captured; extensive opportunities for supplemental private 
enforcement may help to restore a sense of legitimacy to the 
regulatory program, and in particular its enforcement component. 
Less obviously, Professor Engstrom discusses “bubble periods,” 
during which ambiguous regulatory mandates remain unsettled.102 He 
posits that vigorous private enforcement may be troublesome during 
these transitional periods because judicial responses to private 
enforcement actions may be difficult to override legislatively and 
enforcement targets may suffer costly adverse judgments 
notwithstanding subsequent overrides.103 In such cases, allowing 
private enforcement might undermine legitimacy, at least in the eyes 
of the regulated community. This effect would support a strong 
 
 99. Thompson, supra note 26, at 198. In assessing the zealousness critique, Thompson 
added that evidence “suggests that environmental nonprofits have filed a sizable number 
of worthwhile actions that public enforcers either purposefully or unintentionally failed to 
pursue.” Id. at 203; see also id. at 206 (discounting risk of “zealousness error” from citizen 
suits). 
 100. Id. at 188. 
 101. William Andreen and Sidney Shapiro each suggested this possibility in helpful 
comments on a draft of this Article. See Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 56, 
at 84–85 (suggesting that some states filed a significant number of enforcement actions 
only after a citizen had filed a notice of intent to sue). 
 102. Engstrom, supra note 3, at 640. 
 103. Id. at 639–40. 
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gatekeeping regime.104 But if an agency’s delay in filling statutory gaps 
is due not to the costs of regulation but instead to agency disaffection 
with the statutory regime, private enforcement may help to maintain 
public confidence in the rule of law. This scenario would seem to 
favor a weak or nonexistent gatekeeping regime. The gatekeeping 
and other examples discussed in this section therefore highlight the 
need for policymakers to consider how the components of effective 
regulation interact in designing enforcement and compliance 
programs. 
C. Contextual Design Challenges 
The preceding discussion identified five key components of 
effective regulation. In addition, it demonstrated that effective design 
must consider each component as it relates to the others, rather than 
solely as a distinct and isolated regulatory feature. This section 
discusses four contextual issues facing policymakers responsible for 
regulatory design, which may enrich, and complicate, analysis of how 
to craft a program that settles on the best mix of the five components 
of effective regulation addressed above.105 These four contextual 
design issues are (1) the hybrid character of much of contemporary 
governance; (2) the need to confront actual performance; (3) the 
dynamic nature of governance challenges and opportunities; and (4) 
salience, the need to prioritize in making design and implementation 
decisions.106 We list these elements in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Key Design Elements 
Hybrid Character of Governance 
Reality Checking to Assess Past Performance and  
Prepare for Future Challenges and Opportunities 
Dynamic Character
Salience—the Need to Prioritize
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. As is true for virtually all efforts to capture reality through categories, the identity 
and parameters of the categories are open to question. 
 106. We do not claim that these four contextual issues are the only ones relevant to the 
design of effective enforcement and compliance programs. We believe all four are 
important to consider, however, in thinking about possible enforcement and compliance 
promotion options. 
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Figure 1 below depicts how the five components of effective 
regulation described in Section A interact with these four contextual 
design challenges. 
Figure 1: 
Regulation Design 
Goals
Verifiability 
Reward/Sanction 
Norm Clarity 
Legitimacy 
Norm Achievability 
Hybrid 
Governance
Reality Checking 
(Future / Past) 
Dynamic Character Salience 
Regulation Design 
Challenges 
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In short, as Figure 1 shows, each of the contextual design 
challenges has the potential to affect one or more components of 
effective enforcement and compliance promotion.107 As a result, it is 
the interaction of the contextual design challenges and the 
components of effective regulation that should shape the design of 
each component of an enforcement and compliance program such as 
gatekeeping mechanisms.108 The remainder of this section elaborates 
on these interactions. 
1.  Hybrid Governance 
One contextual reality of contemporary governance in the 
United States is its hybrid character. At its most abstract level, we 
view hybrid governance to mean governance composed of 
heterogeneous elements.109 Several manifestations of the hybrid 
character of governance are well known and we mention them only 
briefly. In terms of horizontal hybrid governance issues, both the U.S. 
Constitution and the foundational statute for the administrative state, 
the Administrative Procedure Act,110 reserve specific roles for the 
three branches of our federal government.111 The ongoing debate 
about the appropriate role for the Office of Management and 
Budget’s (“OMB”) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”) highlights the tension concerning the distribution of power 
between and among Congress, the President, and federal agencies.112 
 
 107. The lower box of Figure 1 illustrates the point made in Section B above—the 
components of effective regulation interact with one another, creating synergies with or 
obstacles to the achievement of other elements. Similarly, the upper box illustrates that 
each of the regulatory design challenges discussed in this section interacts and has the 
potential to affect the tasks regulators face in addressing other challenges. Finally, the 
arrows between the two boxes illustrate that feedback loops exist between the design 
challenges and the components of effective regulation. For example, the dynamic 
character of regulation may, over time, shift the manner in which the regulatory 
components interact with one another. 
 108. Professor Engstrom’s focus on the rationalization of private and public 
enforcement litigation as a central challenge of administrative governance illustrates the 
importance of our first contextual design challenge, hybrid governance. See Engstrom, 
supra note 3, at 622. 
 109. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1106 (3d ed. 1993) 
(defining “hybrid” as “marked by heterogeneity in origin, composition, or appearance”). 
 110. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 111. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (setting forth the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (empowering reviewing courts to hold agencies accountable 
by invalidating actions that are in excess of statutory authority). 
 112. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1097 (2006) (arguing that OIRA forces upon administrative 
agencies its own statutory interpretations); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information 
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The lack of judicial review of much of what OIRA does raises issues 
concerning the appropriate role of the judicial branch in presidential 
review of agency activities as well.113 More generally, increasing 
recognition that multiple federal agencies need to be engaged in 
addressing many of the most significant public policy issues we face 
today reflects that horizontal coordination challenges exist within, 
between, and among agencies. These challenges pose a significant 
barrier to effective governance.114 
The cooperative federalism structure Congress adopted in 
enacting the major federal pollution control statutes contributes to 
the hybrid character of contemporary enforcement and compliance 
work by giving states a major role in administrative governance. An 
enormous body of scholarship addresses the vertical governance 
challenges that the cooperative federalism structure poses, including 
in the enforcement and compliance realm.115 Over the past few years, 
EPA has acknowledged these challenges and announced renewed 
efforts to grapple with them more effectively.116 The states’ central 
role in the enforcement and compliance promotion function has 
heavily influenced the design of EPA’s programs; state enforcement 
actions will no doubt continue to affect the design and operation of 
federal enforcement programs for the indefinite future. 
Governance is much more than simply the actions of government 
actors, however, and the quality of governance often benefits (or 
suffers) from the actions of these multiple stakeholders.117 The value 
 
and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1838–44 (2013) 
(attempting to dispel “misconceptions” about OIRA and arguing that it is largely an 
“information aggregator”). 
 113. Many of OIRA’s actions are not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3507(d)(6) (2012); Exec. Order No. 12866, § 10, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 114. Climate change adaptation is a prominent example. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 
13653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819, 66,823 (Nov. 1, 2013) (directing agencies to participate in a 
task force to coordinate action on climate preparedness and resilience); Exec. Order No. 
13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,124–25 (Oct. 5, 2009). See generally Camacho & Glicksman, 
supra note 5 (introducing a framework for evaluating the structural allocation of authority 
among government agencies); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (discussing the difficulties of agency 
coordination among agencies with overlapping regulatory responsibilities). 
 115. For a sampling of this literature, see the sources cited in Camacho & Glicksman, 
supra note 5, at 21 n.6. 
 116. See infra Part III. 
 117. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (defining hybrid governance to include multiple levels of 
government and private entities); see also THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO 
THE NEW GOVERNANCE, at vii (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (“A political dispute has 
been raging . . . over the relative effectiveness of government and private action, and of 
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in assessing alternative regulatory design options, not only to 
acknowledge the reality of hybrid governance, but also to assess its 
promise and perils, is difficult to overstate. In part this is because of 
the recognition that government cannot “solve” problems on its own 
and that a well-designed “pluralistic regulatory landscape” improves 
chances for success.118 As Professor Magali Delmas noted, “[T]he 
inadequacy of governments to resolve some environmental issues has 
generated the search for alternative governance mechanisms.”119 
Considerable work engaging the appropriate shape of this 
pluralistic regulatory landscape has been done, such as contributions 
to the “new governance” literature.120 But as Professor Delmas points 
out, a great deal of additional work is needed: “[T]he research on 
environmental governance without government, or between 
government and other actors, is only just emerging.”121 
Contextualized treatment of this pluralistic landscape is in our view 
likely to be of especial importance and practical value.122 To illustrate 
its value, we offer such contextualized treatment of one example of 
hybrid governance: the use of agency gatekeeping to rationalize 
public and private enforcement litigation, a topic considered recently 
by Professor Engstrom. 
EPA already has significant gatekeeping authority, as Professor 
Engstrom notes.123 We consider here how EPA’s exercise of this 
 
different levels of government, in addressing public needs.”); Jody Freeman, The Private 
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–49 (2000) (arguing that private 
participation in governance is pervasive, requiring consideration of the relationships 
between the public and private spheres); Grabosky, supra note 95, at 118–19 (suggesting 
that technology advances may engender “wiki-regulation”). 
 118. Engstrom, supra note 3, at 629; see Oran A. Young, Governance for Sustainable 
Development in a World of Rising Interdependencies, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 12, 23. 
 119. Magali A. Delmas, Research Opportunities in the Area of Governance for 
Sustainable Development, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 221, 
223. 
 120. See supra note 9 (citing examples of new governance literature). 
 121. Delmas, supra note 119, at 222. 
 122. Engstrom refers to the “complex ecologies of enforcement” within which multiple 
public and private enforcers operate and with which they interact. Engstrom, supra note 3, 
at 623; see also id. at 662 (arguing that “an ideal gatekeeper agency focused on optimal 
deterrence will join and leverage the enforcement efforts of overmatched private 
enforcers who will not otherwise fully vindicate the public interest”). For another recent 
example of analysis of regulatory design of public enforcement mechanisms, see generally 
Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
853 (2014). 
 123. See infra notes 129, 241 and accompanying text (describing the diligent 
prosecution bar). 
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authority might influence the capacities of public and private 
enforcers and affect environmental regulatory enforcement and 
compliance. All other things being equal, EPA would seemingly want 
to exercise its gatekeeping power lightly in order to encourage private 
enforcement litigation in circumstances in which other strategies for 
inducing compliance, such as reliance on positive incentives, do not 
yield desired results. Indeed, in addition to exercising its gatekeeping 
responsibilities with a light touch, EPA might want to engage private 
enforcers affirmatively to encourage invigorated private enforcement 
efforts. Similarly, an agency posture of weak gatekeeping might be 
desirable where obstacles (such as limited government enforcement 
resources) exist to traditional government deterrence-based 
enforcement.124 In other words, an agency may opt for relatively weak 
gatekeeping when limited government capacity exists. 
Conversely, EPA may want to exercise its gatekeeping authority 
aggressively if it is concerned that expansive private enforcement will 
undermine national consistency in approaching compliance 
challenges.125 For example, private enforcement efforts that focus on 
securing particular types of relief with which an agency has concerns, 
in lieu of the types of relief it favors, may influence the desirability of 
a significant private enforcement presence126 because of both 
 
 124. On the other hand, attention to other components of the regulatory process, such 
as clarity and verifiability, might be even more effective, as the Colorado hazardous waste 
example referred to above reflects. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Our purpose 
in this section is to consider EPA’s use of its existing gatekeeping authority, not to propose 
reforms in the scope or nature of that authority. Several experts on workers’ health and 
safety laws have urged the creation of a citizen suit provision analogous to those in many 
federal pollution control statutes to supplement the government’s inadequate enforcement 
initiatives under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 
(2012), that has resulted, among other things, from a shortage of inspectors. See MARTHA 
MCCLUSKEY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE NEXT OSHA: 
PROGRESSIVE REFORMS TO EMPOWER WORKERS 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Next_Generation_OSHA_1207.pdf. Others 
have urged the addition of citizen suit provisions to other statutes, such as those dealing 
with food labeling, to redress perceived government enforcement shortcomings. See, e.g., 
James Springer, Note, The Success of the Citizen Suit: Protecting Consumers from 
Inaccurate Food Labeling by Amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 68 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 401–02 (2013). 
 125. Cf. Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions 
and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 329–
31 (2010) (describing disruptions to the agenda of the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission resulting from an expansive citizen petition mechanism and judicial resistance 
to “setting agency regulatory agendas, such as when plaintiffs challenge agencies’ failures 
to act”). 
 126. See, e.g., David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial 
Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 
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“legislative fidelity” and “coordination” issues, to use Professor 
Engstrom’s terms.127 
The cooperative federalism structure of the environmental laws, 
and the central role of the states in enforcement, is an important part 
of the discussion in attempting to rationalize public and private 
enforcement of those laws.128 Thus, state capacity (in terms of 
resources and will) in bringing enforcement actions is an important 
issue in assessing the need for and desirability of EPA’s exercise of its 
gatekeeping authority. 
We also think it is important in rationalizing enforcement 
litigation to be aware that a state, like EPA, can prevent the filing of a 
citizen suit by commencing and “diligently prosecuting” its own 
enforcement action after being notified by a prospective citizen suit 
plaintiff that it intends to file suit against an alleged violator.129 Both 
scholars and public interest advocates have complained over the years 
that some states have reacted to citizen suit notices by commencing 
an enforcement action against the putative civil suit defendant and 
then settling the action on terms favorable to the regulated entity 
because that entity was important to the state’s economy or had 
valuable political connections.130 EPA has the authority, and 
 
21 ENVTL. L. 175, 192–94 (1991) (describing Justice Department efforts to block citizen 
suit settlements involving expenditures by defendants on environmentally beneficial 
projects); cf. Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Judicial Interpretation: 
First Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 328 (1998) (noting 
tendency of some to “look hard for reasons to block citizen suits that are perceived as 
infringing on government prerogatives or wasting government assets”). 
 127. Engstrom, supra note 3, at 634–41. Engstrom identifies three critiques of private 
enforcement—zealousness, legislative fidelity, and coordination. Id. at 630–41. In his view, 
coordination problems stemming from a mixed public-private enforcement regime include 
wasteful duplication of effort and a lack of coherence that disrupts cooperative 
relationships between regulators and regulatory targets. Id. at 634–37. This issue has arisen 
in the context of supplemental environmental projects, among others. See David Markell, 
Is There a Possible Role for Regulatory Enforcement in the Effort to Value, Protect, and 
Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 549, 575 n.98 (2007). 
 128. States are typically the primary enforcers under federal pollution statutes such as 
the CWA, as indicated below. See infra Part II.A. 
 129. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (2012); 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). To this extent, the federal pollution laws already include a 
gatekeeping mechanism. 
 130. See, e.g., Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 56, at 85 (“While one 
might think that this notice provision would often shame the government into taking 
tough action, it has often been used, in a rather perverse fashion, ‘to blunt more vigorous 
citizen enforcement efforts.’ ”); Trip Gabriel, Ash Spill Shows How Watchdog Was 
Defanged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, at A1 (quoting attorney for environmental NGO who 
complained that North Carolina filed an enforcement action that precluded a CWA citizen 
suit and then entered “a behind-closed-doors settlement” requiring no cleanup); Trip 
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responsibility, to exercise a different type of gatekeeping authority 
when it learns of state action that may undermine effective 
enforcement—here, the federal gatekeeping authority involves EPA’s 
authority to withdraw a state’s authorization.131 Effective enforcement 
to address significant violations under the environmental laws is a 
three-legged stool, with each leg (federal, state, and private 
enforcement) having multiple pieces.132 EPA actually has at least two 
types of gatekeeping authority available to rationalize the use of 
enforcement tools given the multiple actors involved. 
As the previous discussion of agency gatekeeping of private 
enforcement litigation illustrates, it is important to consider the 
hybrid character of enforcement and compliance contextually. The 
range of actors involved in this aspect of environmental regulation, 
however, obviously extends far beyond agency and private enforcers. 
Similarly, the opportunities for hybrid governance to promote 
effective compliance and enforcement extend far beyond the realm of 
ex post enforcement litigation.133 A critical observation about this 
central feature of contemporary governance is that efforts to enhance 
 
Gabriel, Michael Wines & Coral Davenport, Chemical Spill Muddies Picture in a State 
Wary of Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, at 1 (quoting attorney for environmental 
NGO, who claimed that “[t]he state stepped in with sweetheart deals every time we 
threatened to sue” a facility in West Virginia responsible for chemical spill); Editorial, 
Regulatory Favoritism in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at A18 (referring to 
the “tawdry tale” of maneuvering by state regulators to block citizen suits against a 
politically powerful utility company). 
 131. Hammond & Markell, supra note 5, at 317. 
 132. See, e.g., Will Reisinger, Trent A. Dougherty & Nolan Moser, Environmental 
Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to 
Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 17 (2010) (referring to “the 
metaphor of a three-legged stool consisting of state, federal, and citizen legs”). 
 133. According to Delmas, “the inadequacy of governments to resolve some 
environmental issues has generated the search for alternative governance mechanisms.” 
Delmas, supra note 119, at 223. There are enormous varieties of governance, including 
self-regulation in the form of Responsible Care, supply chain influences, and certification 
schemes. See INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14001:2004(E), ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS—REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE, at v (2004), 
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=31807; John C. Cruden, The 
Brave New World of Private Governance, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 60, 60 (discussing 
the increase in private certification standards and their use in protecting forests); Lesley K. 
McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2012); 
Responsible Care, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 
http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/?gclid=CN6klbiLkroCFQ-g4AodLVQAIQ 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2014). Regulatory instruments may entail elements of state, self-
regulatory, and third-party activity. Grabosky, supra note 95, at 120. 
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compliance should take into account how best to engage all 
stakeholders throughout the entire regulatory process.134 
2.  “Reality Checks” As a Contextual Design Issue 
A second type of contextual issue relevant to the design of 
regulatory enforcement structures is what we term the “reality-check” 
feature. In assessing or revisiting regulatory design, it is critical to 
assess the agency’s (here EPA’s) actual performance in conducting 
enforcement, the challenges the agency has faced, and opportunities 
to improve performance by altering regulatory features or practices in 
ways suggested by past experience. As we discuss in more detail in 
Parts II and III below, EPA has experienced and acknowledged 
significant shortcomings in its enforcement and compliance program. 
There are opportunities to improve on this track record with respect 
to each of the five components of effective regulation identified 
above,135 as well as significant challenges in doing so. EPA’s efforts to 
reform its CWA enforcement programs, which are discussed in Part 
III below, respond to its perceptions of past enforcement successes 
and shortcomings. 
3.  Dynamism 
The degree of dynamism is a third contextual issue relevant to 
regulatory design. This feature does not receive much attention in 
 
 134. It is worthwhile to consider the roles that NGOs of all stripes play today in each of 
our five components of effective regulation. See ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY 
ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 1 (listing federal, state, tribal, and local governments, 
regulated parties, courts, interest groups, and the general public as relevant stakeholders). 
For discussion of the roles of NGOs during different parts of the regulatory process, see, 
for example, Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: 
An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 151–
52 (2011) (suggesting that the predominance of certain stakeholders may skew the 
regulatory process in unanticipated ways that frustrate regulatory goals, and concluding 
that “at least some publicly important rules that emerge from the regulatory state may be 
influenced heavily by regulated parties, with little to no counterpressure from the public 
interest”); see also ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 14 
(discussing the role of citizens in the regulatory process); Hammond & Markell, supra 
note 5, at 318 (noting that citizens may file petitions with EPA asserting that a state is not 
effectively enforcing its environmental laws, prompting EPA to investigate potential 
shortcomings); Report on Environmental Violations, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/tips 
(last updated Oct. 29, 2014) (discussing an initiative, entitled the “National Report a 
Violation” website, which was designed to encourage citizens to report potential 
environmental violations to promote verifiability). 
 135. See supra Part I.A. 
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some of the regulatory design literature,136 but we believe it deserves 
emphasis. Effective regulatory design requires an understanding of 
the extent to which key features of regulation are likely to be static or 
dynamic over time. This feature differs from the reality-check feature 
in that it focuses not on whether existing regulatory practices have 
worked as anticipated, but on whether the regulatory environment 
itself has shifted in ways that affect regulatory goals. 
Concerns that climate change is causing transformative shifts in 
the environment are becoming increasingly widespread. Scholars and 
others are beginning to consider the impacts of such changes on not 
only the content of regulation, but also on regulatory structure. For 
example, Professors Robin Craig and J.B. Ruhl recently suggested 
that the impacts of climate change warrant a fundamental reappraisal 
of the structure of agency procedures.137 In particular, they urged 
more attention be given to adaptive approaches to governance rather 
than what they consider to be unavoidably limited ex ante 
approaches: 
The idea of adaptive management is that agencies should be 
free to make more decisions, but that the timing of those 
decisions is spread out into a continuous process that makes 
differentiating between the “front end” and the “back end” of 
decisionmaking much less relevant. Rather than make one 
grand decision and move on, agencies employing adaptive 
management engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking 
following a structured, multistep protocol: (1) definition of the 
problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for 
management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) 
development of conceptual models, (5) selection of future 
actions, (6) implementation and management actions, (7) 
monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).138 
In addition, changes in agency staffing levels and financial 
resources, improvements in monitoring technology, and the capacity 
of regulated parties and NGOs to participate in regulatory 
implementation are among a litany of factors that affect EPA’s 
capacity for effective governance, especially as it pertains to 
 
 136. See generally Engstrom, supra note 3 (discussing regulatory design without 
reference to “dynamism”). 
 137. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 13, at 44–45. 
 138. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
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enforcement and compliance.139 EPA should consider these changes 
in formulating and implementing approaches to achieving desired 
levels of enforcement and compliance more generally. EPA is already 
taking steps to do so. For example, to address compliance challenges 
EPA is increasingly relying heavily on new monitoring tools and data 
management capabilities.140 These include infrared cameras that can 
detect pollution emissions otherwise invisible to the naked eye and 
electronic reporting such as EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Tool 
that are intended to save time and money, increase transparency, and 
ultimately yield improved compliance.141 
Thus, the contextual reality of dynamism suggests that an 
indispensable component of regulatory design is awareness of the 
likelihood that normative objectives may change over time. It is also 
important to consider the shifting capabilities and interests of 
different key actors throughout the entire regulatory enterprise and 
the extent to which these developments should influence design of 
regulatory structures.142 
 
 139. The full array of ways in which the regulatory environment may shift is beyond 
the scope of this Article. A rich literature investigates how regulated parties are motivated 
by different factors, including utilitarian considerations, cultural norms, and habits. It is 
worth considering all of these sources of motivation, and how they may shift over time, in 
regulatory design. See, e.g., Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young, Introduction: New 
Perspectives on Governance for Sustainable Development, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 3, 9; Delmas, supra note 119, at 223–24; Neil 
Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental 
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 307–08 
(2004); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms 
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 58 (2003); Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect 
the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1101–04 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 715, 716–17 (2011). 
 140. See Giles, supra note 27, at 23. 
 141. Id. at 24–26. 
 142. As Figure 1 above shows, the contextual design challenges we have identified may 
affect each other. Approaches such as “new governance” approaches are typically 
dynamic, for example. See, e.g., Grabosky, supra note 95, at 115, 124 (suggesting that the 
increased role of NGOs stems partly from a retreat by government that has created a 
“regulatory vacuum”). Grabosky suggests that “regulatory space is contested, and 
resulting relational interactions between institutions are often complex.” Id. at 116. Some, 
including Professor Engstrom, favor orchestration of different actors, see Engstrom, supra 
note 3, at 623, while others “may see a regulatory system characterized by spontaneity as 
inevitable.” Grabosky, supra note 95, 115–16. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
42 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
4.  Salience 
A final part of the regulatory design puzzle is the importance of 
salience. In a world of limited resources, policymakers interested in 
regulatory design to improve compliance should prioritize changing 
certain aspects of the regulatory process more than others.143 
Informed deliberation about possible redesign of agency governance 
strategies requires attention to the nature and priority of the 
challenges an agency faces. It also requires consideration of all of the 
opportunities available to improve performance. 
To return to Professor Engstrom’s effort to rationalize 
integration of private enforcers into the public compliance promotion 
effort, the possibility of and parameters for agency gatekeeping are 
likely to be salient issues in many contexts (environmental and 
otherwise) in the effort to improve regulatory compliance. It seems 
indisputable, however, that an agency’s first step when confronting an 
enforcement challenge should not be to automatically focus on any 
single component of the regulatory scheme, such as the appropriate 
structure of an agency gatekeeping regime.144 This is a well-
understood concept: while hammers work well for nails, other tools 
are better for other circumstances. Before moving forward to address 
a particular enforcement or compliance challenge, an agency should 
be sure it considers the five key components of environmental 
enforcement and compliance outlined in Part I.A and the contextual 
design issues addressed in this section to assess which mix of viable 
options is likely to prove most effective. 
In the Colorado hazardous waste initiative we discuss above, for 
example, a state agency prioritized promoting compliance in a 
particular sector of the regulated community because of features of 
that community (e.g., high levels of noncompliance, significant 
aggregate volumes of waste generated).145 The agency was then able 
to make significant improvements in its regulatory approach by 
refining a few of our key components of effective regulation, notably 
 
 143. As indicated in Part III.A, prioritization is an important feature of EPA’s ongoing 
effort to transform its CWA enforcement approach. Prioritization based on risk is also an 
important feature of Canada’s effort, especially given increasing demands and limited 
resources. AUDITOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. 
 144. We are not suggesting that Professor Engstrom would urge that such a first step 
focus on gatekeeping or any other particular component of the enforcement process. Our 
discussion in the text is intended to provide a wide lens for considering the value of 
scholarship that offers a more particularized focus on a single regulatory design 
mechanism, such as Professor Engstrom’s consideration of agency gatekeeping strategies. 
 145. See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
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clarity, verifiability, and the mix of sanctions for noncompliance. 
There was little need to consider rationalization of public and private 
enforcement litigation as part of this redesign. The Colorado example 
obviously does not mean that the particular strategies used there to 
improve clarity and verification and, ultimately, compliance should be 
used across the board. Other noncompliance challenges will require 
different responses to yield desired results. Ultimately, agencies 
would be well advised to engage in priority setting on multiple levels 
when addressing enforcement and compliance concerns. A first level 
involves identifying the challenges that most need attention. The 
second involves identifying the mix of tools that is most likely to be 
effective. We suggest that both the components of regulation and 
contextual design issues discussed in this Part offer a starting point for 
taking this second step in a systematic and thoughtful way.146 
II.  CONTEXTUALIZING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DESIGN: AN OVERVIEW OF 
EPA’S COMPLIANCE TRACK RECORD AND CHALLENGES 
As Part I indicates, informed regulatory design requires an 
understanding of the entire regulatory process and of the actors who 
play critical roles throughout that process, whether the goal is the 
design of a regulatory scheme writ large or of a particular piece of 
that scheme such as the enforcement and compliance promotion 
function. To illustrate the importance of context in regulatory design 
we now turn to a brief review of some of the real-world compliance-
related challenges and opportunities EPA faces. In doing so, we focus 
on the second and third design challenges introduced in Part I.C—the 
need to consider an agency’s experience based on past performance 
of the regulatory structures being assessed for possible revision and 
the ways in which the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment 
bears on regulatory design, particularly on effective enforcement and 
compliance structures. 
Evaluating effectiveness in inducing compliance is an 
extraordinarily difficult task.147 It is worth being mindful of the old 
 
 146. Others have pointed to the challenges facing agencies in the enforcement and 
compliance realm. See, e.g., ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 
5 (noting that policymakers must determine “how to balance punishment and deterrence 
through litigation with compliance assistance, incentive approaches, self-auditing or 
correction, and voluntary compliance”). 
 147. Id. at 5, 40 (noting that “how best to measure the success and effectiveness of 
enforcement” is an issue of continuing interest and that evaluating and measuring the 
effectiveness of enforcement and compliance activities “can be quite complicated”). EPA 
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adage about optimists seeing the glass half full and pessimists seeing 
the same glass as half empty in considering EPA’s performance and 
appraisals of its enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, a wide variety of 
observers, inside and outside government, have identified significant 
concerns over EPA efforts to promote compliance.148 EPA faces 
substantial barriers in overcoming these challenges, including 
resource constraints (its own and those of the states), and a changing 
(in some cases expanding) regulated community. There are, however, 
some promising signs on the regulatory design horizon as well. 
The principal point about the contextual overview we provide in 
this Part is that extant and upcoming challenges, as well as emerging 
opportunities, demonstrate that efforts to improve regulatory design 
should proceed with an understanding of the nature of the challenges 
an agency has faced and will face and the tools available to meet 
those challenges. For example, concerns that a regulatory design that 
enables private enforcement suits will lead to problems with private 
enforcement such as overzealousness, coordination challenges, or 
infidelity to legislative objectives are likely to be fairly minor in a 
context in which there is rampant noncompliance, violations are 
causing significant environmental degradation and harm to public 
health, and responsible agencies have proved incapable or unwilling 
to enforce against substantial numbers of significant violators. On the 
other hand, such concerns are likely to be much more relevant when 
 
acknowledged this reality recently in a draft strategy for improving oversight of state 
enforcement. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING 
OVERSIGHT OF STATE ENFORCEMENT PERFORMANCE 2–3 (Aug. 27, 2013 draft) 
[hereinafter EPA, IMPROVING OVERSIGHT], available at http://environblog. 
jenner.com/files/national-strategy-for-improving-oversight-of-state-enforcement-
performance.pdf (link provided in Steven M. Siros, EPA Proposes Increased Oversight Of 
State Enforcement Activities (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://environblog. 
jenner.com/corporate_environmental_l/2013/10/epa-proposes-increased-oversight-over-
state-enforcement-activities.html) (noting the complexity of measuring state enforcement 
and that EPA’s data are incomplete in part because its current metrics are based on 
activities states perform, rather than compliance levels within regulated sectors, which are 
difficult to determine). There is an extensive measurement literature. The Government 
Performance and Results Act (“GPRA”), in its various manifestations, seeks to focus on 
results and their measurement. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-
617T, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: GPRA MODERNIZATION ACT IMPLEMENTATION 
PROVIDES IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES TO ADDRESS GOVERNMENT CHALLENGES 
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-617T; Memorandum from Jacob 
J. Lew, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies (Apr. 14, 2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-
17.pdf (“Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative and Implementing the 
GPRA Modernization Act of 2010”). 
 148. See infra notes 149–172 and accompanying text. 
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compliance challenges are complex and require sophisticated, 
integrated strategies, and a responsible agency’s efforts to address 
these challenges efficiently and effectively are likely to be 
undermined by the presence of a host of other erstwhile enforcers. 
A. Agency Enforcement Records 
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), EPA’s Office 
of Inspector General (“OIG”), EPA’s Administrator, and EPA’s own 
enforcement office have all offered highly critical assessments of 
EPA’s performance in promoting compliance with environmental 
regulatory requirements.149 In a December 2012 report, for example, 
the GAO noted that “[i]n recent years, EPA has reported that it is 
not achieving all of the environmental and public health benefits it 
expected in regulating certain entities because of substantial rates of 
noncompliance in some programs.”150 Compounding the challenge in 
inducing compliance at desired levels is the enforcers’ ignorance of 
the scope of the problem they are addressing. As the GAO also 
noted, “[B]ecause of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in 
some programs, such as the [National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program under the CWA], 
EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities’ compliance.”151 
Scholars have also noted EPA’s failure to require regulated entities to 
submit the kinds of information needed for accurate agency 
assessment of compliance status.152 
Concerns about government enforcement extend beyond EPA’s 
performance. An essential feature of many of the key environmental 
regulatory statutes is their reliance on a cooperative federalism 
structure.153 Congress has enacted pollution control laws such as the 
 
 149. For a recent collection of some of the reviews, see ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY 
ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 3. See infra Part III for additional discussion of concerns 
about EPA’s enforcement record. 
 150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-115, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: EPA SHOULD DEVELOP A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ITS NEW COMPLIANCE 
INITIATIVE 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO, STRATEGIC PLAN], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 2. 
 152. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1348–49 (2010) (discussing data inadequacies in regulatory 
requirements for toxic air pollutant emissions). 
 153. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) (declaring the rights and responsibilities of 
Congress and the states under the CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (setting forth the states’ 
responsibilities under the CAA). For discussion of the role of cooperative federalism in 
environmental law, see generally Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative 
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CAA and CWA, charging EPA with ultimate responsibility for 
implementing these laws and achieving their goals (through actions 
that include standard setting, review of state-issued permits, and 
concurrent enforcement authority).154 It has also empowered qualified 
and interested states, however, to play a significant role in 
implementation, through planning, permitting, and enforcement, 
under laws states adopt for that purpose.155 Congress has done so, 
among other reasons, out of respect for state sovereignty, especially 
in areas of traditional state concern,156 to take advantage of state 
expertise about local conditions, to support the legitimacy of 
environmental regulation, and to enhance the total resources 
available to tackle environmental problems.157 Over the years, EPA 
has authorized increasing numbers of states to take primary 
responsibility for implementation of the major environmental laws, 
and the states are regarded as the primary enforcers under the major 
federal environmental regulatory statutes.158 As a result, much of the 
compliance promotion work is now performed by the states with 
oversight from EPA. According to one account, states “conduct 
about ninety percent of all environmental regulatory inspections and 
file eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions.”159 
Moreover, the number of state enforcement actions may dwarf the 
 
Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 719 (2006). 
 154. Glicksman, supra note 153, at 737–47. 
 155. EPA has the opportunity to play a significant role even if a state is authorized to 
implement a program. Not all of the federal environmental statutes are built on a 
cooperative federalism foundation. Statutes such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012), for example, are not. 
 156. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, 
and eliminate pollution . . . .”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (concerning air pollution); 
42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (concerning solid waste management). 
 157. See William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate 
Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 
23, 53 (2009) (“Empowering state and local governments to play their own supplementary 
roles in enforcing the law could be the equivalent of additional cops on the beat.”); Erin 
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 90 (2011). 
 158. See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5, at 43 (“Congress established a 
‘cooperative federalism’ structure that makes EPA ultimately responsible for program 
delivery while reserving the primary front lines implementation role for willing and 
capable states.”); McAllister, supra note 133, at 21 (“In many regulatory programs, states 
have the primary responsibility for enforcement and are overburdened.”). 
 159. McAllister, supra note 133, at 21; see also ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY 
ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 11 (“A significant proportion of inspections and 
enforcement actions are conducted by the states.”). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
2014] AGENCY ENFORCEMENT 47 
level of private enforcement, even under a statute such as the CWA 
in which citizen enforcement historically has been high.160 Thus, 
assessments of the efficacy of state performance are (or to be 
plausible must be) at the heart of efforts to evaluate government 
enforcement performance more generally.161 
The GAO and EPA’s OIG, among others, have documented 
significant deficiencies in states’ performance.162 Both entities have 
reported inconsistencies in state environmental enforcement, and the 
OIG characterized state enforcement programs as 
“underperforming,” notwithstanding EPA’s efforts to improve state 
performance and oversight consistency.163 
EPA’s enforcement office also has acknowledged serious 
deficiencies in state performance. In an August 2013 draft strategy to 
improve oversight of state enforcement, EPA noted that its reviews of 
state performance identified four “unresolved and recurring” 
significant issues concerning state enforcement (or the integration of 
federal and state enforcement programs) that require focused 
attention: 
 
• Widespread and persistent data inaccuracy and 
incompleteness in national data systems, which make it hard 
to identify when serious problems exist or to track state 
actions; 
 
• Routine failure of states to identify and report significant 
noncompliance; 
 
 160. See Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 56, at 75–76 (reporting that 
referrals of enforcement cases to state attorneys general significantly outstripped citizen 
suits filed, even at a time when state enforcement was declining). 
 161. See ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 3 (noting that 
given states’ substantial role under federal pollution statutes, “state autonomy versus the 
extent of federal oversight is often at the center of debate with regard to environmental 
enforcement”). 
 162. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. NO. 12-P-
0113, EPA MUST IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF STATE ENFORCEMENT 8 (2011) [hereinafter 
OIG, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT], available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/202/20111209-
12-P-0113.pdf; EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 5; Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, 
Deputy Adm’r, and Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement & Compliance 
Initiative to Arthur Elkins, Inspector Gen. 1 (Mar. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2012/12-P-0113-Agency_Response.pdf (“Inspector 
General’s (OIG) December 9, 2011 Evaluation Report, Project No. OPE-FYl0-0022, 
‘EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement’ ”). For additional examples, see the 
sources collected in ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 2 n.5. 
 163. GAO, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 150, at 2. 
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• Routine failure of states to take timely or appropriate 
enforcement actions to return violating facilities to 
compliance, potentially allowing pollution to continue 
unabated; and 
 
• Failure of states to take appropriate penalty actions, which 
results in ineffective deterrence for noncompliance and an 
unlevel playing field for companies that do comply.164 
 
The upshot is that, as EPA’s OIG has found, “state enforcement 
programs frequently do not meet national enforcement goals.”165 The 
OIG found that during fiscal years 2003 to 2009, which was before 
some of the most significant funding declines described below 
occurred, “performance was low across the board,” with some states 
performing far below average.166 For example, EPA established a 
national goal that states inspect 100% of major CAA emitters every 
two years, but the Inspector General found that only eight states met 
that goal.167 As of 2009, EPA set a national goal that states inspect 
100% of CWA major permit holders every two years, but in 2010, 
only two states met that goal, the national average was only 61%, and 
thirteen states inspected fewer than 50% of major facilities.168 
Similarly, only two states met EPA’s target for inspections of 
hazardous waste generators under RCRA, and states averaged 
inspections at only 62% of the targeted number of facilities.169 The 
OIG concluded that EPA had failed to hold its regional offices 
“accountable for ensuring that states adequately enforce 
environmental laws,” and that EPA regions did not consistently 
intervene to correct state deficiencies.170 
 
 164. EPA, IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, supra note 147, at 4; see also ESWORTHY, HOW 
ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 11, 15–16 (identifying limited information and 
inconsistencies in EPA databases concerning state enforcement and noting EPA’s 
difficulties in “accurately and consistently tracking the size of the regulated populations”). 
For EPA’s reviews, conducted under its State Review Framework (“SRF”), see State 
Review Framework, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/state/srf/index.html (last 
updated Aug. 20, 2014). 
 165. OIG, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, supra note 162, at 8. 
 166. Id. at 8. 
 167. Id. at 9. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 10. 
 170. Id. at 11, 15. Some statutes authorize EPA to withdraw authority for state 
permitting programs not administered in accordance with statutory requirements. See, e.g., 
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As the GAO has noted, “Given these challenges, as well as 
growing federal and state budget pressures, EPA stated that it has 
become increasingly difficult to rely primarily on its traditional 
approach of inspecting individual entities to increase compliance with 
the nation’s environmental laws and regulations.”171 Consistent with 
this assessment, EPA recently announced a new initiative—Next 
Generation Compliance—to improve performance by capitalizing on 
advances in emissions monitoring and information technology.172 As 
Part III below indicates, the agency has also initiated a program 
under the CWA to address deficiencies with exclusive reliance on 
traditional enforcement, and that program illustrates the value of the 
holistic approach to enforcement that we recommend here. 
B. Declining Resources 
The adequacy of government resources to promote compliance 
has been a long-standing concern that seems unlikely to be addressed 
in the near term.173 Most of EPA’s annual funding comes from 
discretionary appropriations. The agency’s funds increased sharply in 
the late 1970s as EPA began implementing many of the foundational 
environmental laws adopted earlier that decade.174 Funding dipped in 
 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (2012) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2012) (RCRA). One of the 
prerequisites for delegation of permitting authority to the states is adequate state 
authority to carry out the regulatory program, including enforcement requirements. 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7). For discussion of EPA’s exercise of that authority, see generally 
Hammond & Markell, supra note 5. 
  Statistics such as the number of enforcement actions brought or the amount of 
penalty dollars recovered in enforcement actions do not necessarily correlate with either 
levels of environmental protection achieved or levels of compliance. The need for 
enforcement action may fall, for example, if earlier steps in the regulatory process have 
succeeded in making compliance easier and motivating regulated entities to comply. 
Nevertheless, EPA has acknowledged problems in some states’ enforcement records and 
in EPA regional offices’ oversight of these programs. See EPA, IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, 
supra note 147, at 2–3 (“EPA’s current metrics [for state enforcement activity] are based 
on the activities the states perform and not on the level of compliance within regulated 
sectors, which is difficult to assess with the information currently available.”). 
 171. GAO, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 150, at 2. 
 172. See Giles, supra note 27, at 22; infra Parts II.B & III. The GAO has suggested that 
EPA develop a “strategic plan to integrate Next Generation Compliance into its 
enforcement and compliance program.” GAO, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 150, at 9. 
EPA is in the process of doing so. Id. 
 173. In 2000, Barton Thompson noted that “the enforcement wings of both federal and 
state environmental agencies are often woefully understaffed and underfunded.” 
Thompson, supra note 26, at 191. For discussion of some of the reasons for underfunding, 
see MINTZ, supra note 5, at 130–31, 173–75, 180, 194–98. 
 174. EPA’s budget increased from $770 million in fiscal year 1976 to $2.7 billion in 
fiscal year 1977 to $5.4 billion in both fiscal years 1978 and 1979. EPA’s Budget and 
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the early 1980s and then leveled off until late in that decade, after 
which it increased fairly regularly until fiscal year 2005.175 The enacted 
budget for the agency fell slightly for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, 
bringing appropriations approximately back to the amounts provided 
by Congress during the late 1990s.176 Adjusted for inflation, EPA’s 
funding in fiscal year 2009 was slightly lower than it was in fiscal year 
1978, according to the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”).177 
After reaching a peak of $10.3 billion in fiscal year 2010, the agency’s 
budget declined to about $8.5 billion in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 
and to a little less in fiscal year 2013.178 
Further cuts, perhaps significant ones, seem almost inevitable, at 
least in the near term.179 Environmental group spokespersons have 
characterized EPA budget cuts as an indirect way to weaken 
environmental regulations, likening the situation to “death by a 
 
Spending, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last updated Mar. 4, 
2014) [hereinafter EPA, Budget]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. ROBERT ESWORTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42520, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA): APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY2013, at 39 
(2012) [hereinafter ESWORTHY ET AL., APPROPRIATIONS], available at http://www.fas.org 
/sgp/crs/misc/R42520.pdf. 
 178. EPA, Budget, supra note 174. EPA received $14.8 million in appropriated funds in 
fiscal year 2009, but about half took the form of emergency supplemental appropriations 
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115. ESWORTHY ET AL., APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 177, at 2, 39, 41. EPA’s budget 
declined by eighteen percent from FY 2010 to FY 2012, not counting the additional cuts 
caused by sequestration in 2013. Coral Davenport, EPA Funding Reductions Have 
Kneecapped Environmental Enforcement, NAT’L J. (Mar. 3, 2013), 
http://nationaljournal.com/daily/epa-funding-reductions-have-kneecapped-environmenal-
enforcement-20130303. 
 179. See, e.g., Jean Chemnick & Jason Plautz, Agency Takes $300M Hit in Obama 
Proposal that Cuts Budget for 5th Consecutive Year, E&E NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2014/03/04/stories/1059995510. Some past and proposed 
future cuts seem linked to hostility to EPA’s overall mission. A 2013 House 
Appropriations Committee press release, for example, explained that legislation 
proposing further budget cuts “reflects significant efforts to rein in the EPA—an agency 
that has been rife with governmental overreach, overspending on ineffective and 
unnecessary programs, and costly and questionable regulations.” Press Release, Comm. on 
Appropriations, U.S. House of Rep. (July 22, 2013), available at 
http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=343384; see also 
Interior Appropriations Bill Limits EPA, Conservation Spending, FARM FUTURES (July 
24, 2013), http://farmfutures.com/story-interior-appropriations-bill-limits-epa-conservation 
-spending-0-100631-spx_1 (statement of House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers) 
(“In addition, by holding back overly zealous and unnecessary environmental regulations, 
this bill can have a positive effect on our economy and will help encourage job growth.”). 
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thousand cuts.”180 These cuts are likely to affect the agency’s capacity 
to fulfill its responsibilities, including its enforcement function. EPA 
announced in early 2014, for example, that increasing budget pressure 
and resulting uncertainty had prompted it to reduce its workforce 
through employee buyouts.181 EPA’s workforce had already declined 
between 2004 and 2012 during a period when the overall number of 
federal employees grew by fourteen percent.182 Among other things, 
according to a spokesperson for a government employees’ union, the 
buyouts will result in a reduction in the number of enforcement 
officials available to do inspections.183 
 
 180. Phil Taylor & Jason Plautz, House Proposed ‘Devastating’ Cuts to Interior, EPA 
Accounts in Fiscal 2014, E&E NEWS (May 22, 2013), http://www.eenews.net 
/eedaily/stories/1059981595 (quoting Frank O’Donnell of Clean Air Watch). 
 181. See Emily Yehle, Strapped Agency Prepares Hundreds of Buyouts in Sweeping 
Workforce Overhaul, E&E NEWS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/ 
stories/1059993758. 
 182. EPA’s permanent career employees fell by approximately one percent during this 
period. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-215, FEDERAL 
WORKFORCE: RECENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT AND 
COMPENSATION 6, 14 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660449.pdf; Emily 
Yehle, Interior Lost Employees Even as Governmentwide Numbers Grew, E&E NEWS 
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.eenews.net.eenewspm/2014/01/29/stories/1059993678. EPA’s 
peak workforce occurred in fiscal year 1999 and had declined by 5.5% by fiscal year 2012. 
See ESWORTHY ET AL., APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 177, at 43 (noting general 
downward trend in Full Time Equivalents (“FTEs”) since FY 2001); EPA, Budget, supra 
note 174 (noting a decrease in workforce from 1999 (18,110) to 2012 (17,106)). For graphic 
depictions of EPA’s budget and full-time equivalent staffing levels over time, see OFFICE 
OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. EPA-190-S-13-001, FY 2014 
BUDGET IN BRIEF 13 (2013), available at http://www.radonleaders.org/sites/ 
default/files/EPA_FY_2014.pdf. 
  The size of the workforce as a whole does not necessarily tell the complete story. 
The GAO has criticized EPA for struggling “to identify its human resource needs and to 
deploy its staff throughout the agency in a manner that would do the most good.” U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-149T, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND BUDGET OBSERVATIONS 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585707.pdf (statement of David C. Trimble, 
Director Natural Resources and Environment); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. NO. 11-P-0136, EPA NEEDS BETTER AGENCY-WIDE 
CONTROLS OVER STAFF RESOURCES 6 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov 
/oig/reports/2011/20110222-11-P-0136.pdf (“[EPA’s] weak control environment for 
position management does not provide a reasonable assurance that EPA staff resources 
are being effectively managed.”); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, REP. NO. 11-P-0639, EPA NEEDS WORKLOAD DATA TO BETTER JUSTIFY 
FUTURE WORKFORCE LEVELS 9 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/ 
reports/2011/201110914-11-P-0630.pdf (discussing the need for “each [EPA] region [to 
have] actual data on resource availability and needs”).  
 183. Yehle, supra note 181. 
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The impact of a drop in real funding over the years has been 
magnified by the increase in EPA’s regulatory responsibilities 
resulting from the enactment of new statutory programs (such as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act in 1980184 and the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act in 1986185) and the expansion of regulatory 
programs—often in ways that drew many new sources within the 
scope of those programs—through amendments to RCRA in 1984,186 
the CWA in 1987,187 and the CAA in 1990.188 
The combination of EPA’s declining resource pool and increased 
responsibilities has presented the agency with difficult choices, some 
of which may impair EPA’s enforcement capacity.189 In late 2013, 
EPA issued a Draft Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2014 to 2018.190 In 
the portion of the Plan devoted to the goal of protecting health and 
the environment by enforcing laws and assuring compliance, EPA 
trumpeted its commitment to a “new [enforcement] paradigm” under 
its Next Generation Compliance Initiative.191 EPA predicted that this 
Initiative would enhance enforcement and compliance by relying on 
innovative enforcement approaches that use new monitoring and 
reporting technologies.192 News reports, however, focused on the 
portions of the Plan indicating that EPA would cut federal 
 
 184. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675 (2012)). 
 185. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1100–11050 
(2012)). 
 186. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 
3221 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012)). 
 187. Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)). 
 188. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
 189. See Memorandum of EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance—
Areas of Proposed Budget Adjustment for FY13, at 1 (available through a link in Joel 
Mintz, Cutting EPA’s Enforcement Budget: What It Might Mean (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=A6A2E941-98B3-8007-
9CEEB42458BED78E). This source indicates that EPA’s Office of Enforcement 
Compliance and Assurance (“OECA”) responded to the fiscal year 2013 budget by 
proposing “disinvestment” in areas such as acid rain control and reduced enforcement of 
regulatory programs. Id. at 1, 5–6. 
 190. See Draft FY 2014–2018 EPA Strategic Plan; Availability, 78 Fed. Reg. 69,412 
(Nov. 19, 2013) (notice of availability); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT FY 2014–2018 
EPA STRATEGIC PLAN (2013) [hereinafter EPA, DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN], available at 
http://progressivereform.org/articles/EPA_Draft_Strategic_Plan112013.pdf. 
 191. EPA, DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 190, at 42, 44. The Initiative is 
described further at supra note 5 and accompanying text, and infra Part III. 
 192. EPA, DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 190, at 44. 
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inspections by one-third and reduce the number of civil cases filed 
each year by twenty-three percent.193 EPA insisted that its decision to 
focus on the biggest violators and to implement real-time monitoring 
of emissions to prevent violations would enhance compliance.194 The 
shift in enforcement strategy appeared to have been induced at least 
in part, however, by budgetary pressures, as reflected in the 
concession by a top EPA enforcement official that “[o]bviously, 
necessarily with budget cuts, we have to make tough choices.”195 
The decline in resources available to the federal government for 
environmental protection programs generally, and for enforcement 
functions specifically, is likely to have ripple effects on the robustness 
of state programs.196 The federal government has long provided 
financial assistance in the form of grants and loans to assist the states 
in performing their roles under the federal environmental statutes.197 
Between fiscal years 2004 and 2012, annual appropriations for EPA 
categorical grants to assist states in implementing air, water, pesticide, 
 
 193. See, e.g., Neela Bannerjee, EPA Plans to Sharply Reduce Inspections, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 10, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/10/business/la-fi-epa-enforcement-
20131211. The number of inspections conducted and enforcement actions initiated had 
already fallen in fiscal year 2013. See Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, 
Fiscal Year 2013 EPA Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results, EPA.GOV 5–6 (Jan. 
13, 2013), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-02/documents/fy-2013-
enforcement-annual-results-charts-2-6-14_0.pdf#page=5. These numbers provoked an 
environmental group spokesperson to remark: “They’re not doing more with less, they’re 
doing less with less . . . .” EPA Urged to Overhaul Enforcement Strategy After FY13 Results 
Decrease, INSIDE EPA (Feb. 12, 2014), http://environmentalnewsstand.com/inside-
epa/epa-urged-overhaul-enforcement-strategy-after-fy13-results-decrease (subscription 
required).  
 194. See Bannerjee, supra note 193; Emily Yehle, Agency Plans to Drastically Scale 
Back Enforcement, E&E NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/ 
stories/1059991523 (referring to EPA’s intent to focus on work “that makes the biggest 
difference”); see also Anthony Adragna, Enforcement Cuts, Lack of Detail on Climate 
Lead Concerns About EPA Strategic Plan, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 110 (Jan. 10, 
2014) (reporting claim that the Next Generation Compliance Program would create a 
more efficient and targeted enforcement program); Jessica Coomes, EPA Enforcement 
Cases Drop 20 Percent After Decision to Prioritize ‘Larger’ Cases, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 
No. 7, at 452 (Feb. 14, 2014) (reporting EPA’s intent “to pursue larger more complex, risk-
based enforcement cases leading to significant environmental and health gains”). 
 195. Yehle, supra note 194. 
 196. See, e.g., Reisinger et al., supra note 132, at 21 (“The cooperative model also 
makes the enforcement of national environmental objectives subject to budget cuts and 
shortfalls in each individual state, which further threatens the effectiveness of cooperative 
federalism.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective 
on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 595–97 (2008) (describing “resource pooling” rationale 
for federal financial assistance to the states and early examples of such assistance). 
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and hazardous substance programs shrank by about eighty-five 
million dollars.198 The Environmental Council of the States (“ECOS”) 
has expressed concern about reductions in federal funding for state 
environmental programs.199 Some within the federal government 
apparently share these concerns.200 
The reductions in federal financial support for the states were 
especially problematic given that many states were cutting funds for 
their own agencies and enforcement programs at the same time. 
ECOS concluded in 2009 and 2010 that reductions in state budgets for 
environmental enforcement threatened the viability of state 
enforcement programs.201 Between fiscal years 2011 and 2012, twenty-
four states reduced funding for their environmental agencies,202 
reflecting “[a]n overall trend of decreasing budgets” for funding for 
state environmental agencies and, according to ECOS, 
“jeopardiz[ing] states’ ability to implement federally delegated 
programs and policies.”203 The CRS expressed concern about a 
 
 198. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-504R, FUNDING FOR 10 
STATES’ PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY FOUR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
CATEGORICAL GRANTS 1 (2013) [hereinafter GAO, FUNDING FOR 10], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-504r. Appropriations for EPA categorical grants 
decreased from $1.17 billion in fiscal year 2004 to $1.09 billion in fiscal year 2012. Id. at 4. 
For a graph plotting the amounts provided during this period, see id. 
 199. ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 4 (citing R. STEVEN 
BROWN, ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES, 
2005–2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.ecos.org/files/3057_file_March_2008_ 
Green_Report.pdf.).  
 200. See id. (“The level of federal funding allocated to states and tribes to support 
effective enforcement of federal pollution control laws has . . . been a long-standing 
congressional concern.”). It is often difficult to follow the money trail, given that 
“[d]etailed reporting of federal funding to states and states’ funding contributions for 
pollution control enforcement/compliance activities is not readily available.” Id. at 39. 
 201. Id. at 4 (citing R. STEVEN BROWN, ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, STATUS OF 
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY BUDGETS, 2009–2011 (2010), available at 
http://www.ecos.org/files/4157_file_August_2010_Green_Report.pdf; VICTORIA PHILLIPS 
ET AL., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, IMPACTS OF REDUCTIONS IN FY 2010 ON 
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY BUDGETS (2010), available at http://www.ecos.org/ 
files/4011_file_March_2010_ECOS_Green_Report.pdf; BETH GRAVES, ENVTL. COUNCIL 
OF THE STATES, FUNDING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: STATE BUDGET 
SHORTFALLS AND IDEAS FOR MITIGATING THEM (2009), available at 
http://www.ecos.org/files/3629_file_June_2009_ECOS_Green_Report.pdf). 
 202. See R. STEVEN BROWN, ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, STATUS OF STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY BUDGETS, 2011–2013, at 1 (2012), available at 
http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/41680992/September%202012%20Green%20Report.
pdf. The twenty-four states with decreasing budgets experienced larger changes than the 
twenty-five states with increasing budgets, and the total decline in state environmental 
agency budgets from FY2011 to FY2012 averaged $357,015 per state. Id. 
 203. Id. at 2, 5–6. 
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mismatch between federal support provided and state needs, noting 
that “[t]he adequacy of federal funds to assist states with these 
responsibilities has become a more contentious issue over time, as 
state revenues and spending generally have declined under recent 
economic conditions.”204 The GAO similarly noted that “the 
importance of federal grants has increased, as some states have 
reduced their funding for certain environmental programs to address 
decreased state revenues and significant deficits in funding.”205 
Some states responded to reduced funding for environmental 
programs by reducing staff levels and cutting outreach and technical 
assistance programs that can facilitate compliance.206 State 
environmental officials have reported to the GAO that resource 
constraints have required them to institute hiring freezes and reduce 
staff through attrition and layoffs.207 In addition, these officials 
reported that funding freezes or declines have affected their capacity 
to conduct activities such as permitting, inspections, and monitoring, 
all of which are critical to effective enforcement.208 
All of this is to say that implementation of environmental 
enforcement programs does not occur in a static world. Rather, both 
the responsibilities and capacities of regulators shift over time. 
Particularly when growing responsibilities, such as those described in 
the next section, accompany shrinking resources, policymakers 
engaged in regulatory design should be cognizant of and account for 
those realities. 
C. Changes in the Regulated Community and Regulator 
Responsibilities and Capacities: The Dynamic Character of 
Regulation 
At the same time that resources available to agencies to enforce 
environmental laws have diminished, challenges facing enforcement 
officials have shifted. Among the factors that have made effective 
enforcement more daunting for some agencies and programs are an 
increase in the number of regulated entities; increases in regulatory 
responsibilities and mandates for agencies and regulated entities 
 
 204. ESWORTHY ET AL., APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 177, at 1. 
 205. GAO, FUNDING FOR 10, supra note 198, at 1. 
 206. Id. at 4, 9. For a discussion on the potential value of technical assistance and 
outreach by regulators, see generally Carol Foley & Michael Elliott, Systems Design and 
the Promotion of Pollution Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance 
Programs, 29 GA. L. REV. 449 (1995). 
 207. GAO, FUNDING FOR 10, supra note 198, at 4, 9–10. 
 208. Id. 
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alike; implementation of programs that depend on making difficult 
causal connections between regulated activities and environmental 
harms; a movement in some contexts away from uniform regulatory 
treatment toward differentiated responsibility, which may arise under 
market-based approaches to regulation or other deviations from 
traditional regulatory tools; and a commitment to target significant 
violations by smaller sources that have not traditionally been the 
focus of enforcement attention and activity.209 
For various reasons, contemporary government enforcement 
officials would face significant challenges in achieving effective 
enforcement of environmental laws even if the financial resources 
available for enforcement were not declining. In some instances, the 
size of the regulated community has grown.210 EPA has referred to 
the “breadth and expanding scope of the [National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)] regulated universe” as 
one of the challenges it faces in improving its enforcement 
performance.211 The number of point sources subject to CWA 
permitting requirements doubled over a recent ten-year period.212 A 
recent appellate court decision established, for example, that 
pesticide applications that allow chemical residues to enter surface 
water bodies may trigger regulation under that statute.213 Stormwater 
permitting has also increased the size of the regulated community.214 
 
 209. ESWORTHY, HOW ARE THEY ENFORCED?, supra note 67, at 4 (noting that 
funding for enforcement “had not kept pace with the increasing number of mandates and 
regulations, or with inflation”). 
 210. See, e.g., M. Bruce Harper, Trust but Verify: Innovation in Compliance Monitoring 
As a Response to the Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 
593, 614 (1996) (“An increase in the number of generators alone holds some potential to 
make environmental enforcement more difficult.”). 
 211. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 10. 
 212. McAllister, supra note 133, at 21. For further discussion of the expansion of 
regulated sources under the Act, see infra notes 243–251 and accompanying text 
(discussing EPA’s CWAP).  
 213. See Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 940 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 214. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. NO. 2005-P-
00024, LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE OF REGULATED ENTITIES IMPEDES 
EPA’S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE CHANGES IN REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 7 (2005) 
[hereinafter OIG, LIMITED KNOWLEDGE], available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/ 
2005/20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf (identifying a forty-five percent increase in sources 
requiring CWA stormwater permits between 2001 and 2005). During the same period, the 
number of manufacturers covered by the Toxic Substances Control Act increased by sixty-
one percent. Id. Likewise, discharges from expanding hydraulic fracturing activities may 
trigger CWA requirements. See Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), 
Federalism, and the Water-Energy Nexus, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 241, 249 (2013). 
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The resulting increase in regulated entities may present 
difficulties for federal and state regulators.215 In New York, for 
example, regulated point sources increased by sixty-three percent 
between 1999 and 2012.216 In some contexts, it may be possible to 
reduce the burdens of addressing newly expanded categories of 
regulated sources through the creation of general permits, such as the 
ones available under the CWA’s dredge and fill217 and NPDES218 
permit programs. Indeed, EPA has developed a general permit for 
pesticide and herbicide applications over surface waters.219 General 
permits undoubtedly reduce the resource commitment a state must 
make at the permit approval stage, but agencies continue to have 
ongoing responsibility for monitoring, oversight of reporting, and 
inspections.220 If agencies seek to reduce their administrative burdens 
by not only switching from source specific to general permitting, but 
also by minimizing oversight of sources covered by general permits 
through reduced inspections or sporadic review of regulated entities’ 
reports, one trade-off will be a decline in verifiability and 
accountability.221 
 
 215. See Kara Cook, Note, The Middle Ground of Pesticide Regulation: Why EPA 
Should Use a Watershed-Based Permitting Scheme in Its New Aquatic Pesticides Rule, 37 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 487 (2010) (“There are significant monitoring and enforcement 
challenges because of the sudden explosion in permitting applicants.”). 
 216. ANDREW POSTIGLIONE, ENVTL. ADVOCATES OF N.Y., TURNING A BLIND EYE 
TO ILLEGAL POLLUTION: DEC’S FAILING RECORD ON ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS 8 (2013), available at http://www.eany.org/our-work/reports/turning-blind-eye-
illegal-pollution-september-2013. 
 217. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012). 
 218. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a) (2013). See generally Cal. Sportfishing Prot. 
Alliance v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 728 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (involving California’s 
Industrial Activities Storm Water General Permit); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: 
NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413 
(2007) (discussing the use of general permits to implement the NPDES permit program). 
 219. See, e.g., Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
Pesticide General Permit for Point Source Discharges From the Application of Pesticides, 
76 Fed. Reg. 68,750, 68,750 (Nov. 7, 2011). 
 220. See, e.g., id. at 68,755 (listing among Pesticide General Permit requirements the 
duties of applicators to monitor adverse incidents and document visual monitoring 
activities). General NPDES permits may regulate one or more discharge categories, 
provided all sources within a category are subject to the same or similar monitoring 
requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(D) (2013). 
 221. Efforts to enforce against private landowners, small businesses, or sectors of the 
business community (such as agriculture) that traditionally have not been enforcement 
targets also may pose new challenges, such as increased political opposition. Federal 
efforts to enforce wetlands permitting requirements under the CWA, for example, have 
generated political opposition and adverse publicity. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, 
Wetlands? What Wetlands?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/20/wetlands-what-wetlands/?_r=0 (describing Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 
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Changes in the nature of regulatory approaches also may 
complicate agency performance of enforcement and compliance-
related functions. For example, EPA has recently shifted its focus in 
implementing the CWA from enforcement of technology-based 
effluent limitations applicable to point sources to achieving state 
water quality standards through the implementation of ambient 
quality-based effluent limitations.222 Water quality standards are often 
expressed in terms of maximum ambient concentrations of pollutants 
in a surface water body, but are sometimes couched in narrative 
terms.223 Implementation of such a standard requires a state 
environmental agency to establish a total maximum daily load 
(“TMDL”), which is an aggregate amount of pollution that may be 
discharged into a surface water body without resulting in 
concentrations of regulated pollutants in excess of those allowed by a 
state water quality standard.224 Tasks such as establishing enforceable 
limits, monitoring whether allowed loadings (clearly enforceable or 
less so) are producing desired environmental results, and adapting to 
the findings are all resource-intensive enterprises.225 The burdens are 
 
(2012), a CWA enforcement action to block construction of a single-family home on 
property alleged to contain regulated wetlands, as an example of the view of libertarians 
and tea party members that EPA is the “embodiment of government run amok”). 
 222. See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 614 (noting an increase in the role 
of water quality standards). 
 223. For a discussion of the use of numeric and narrative water quality standards under 
the CWA, see Craig N. Johnston, Don’t Go Near the Water: The Ninth Circuit Undermines 
Water Quality Enforcement, 24 ENVTL. L. 1289, 1300 (1994). Cf. Am. Paper Inst. v. EPA, 
996 F.2d 346, 355–56 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding EPA regulations that directed states to 
convert narrative water quality criteria in state water quality standards, through the 
TMDL allocation process, into numerical effluent limitations for individual point sources); 
Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1176 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (upholding 
EPA mandate that Florida convert water quality standard for nutrients from narrative to 
numeric form), appeal dismissed, 737 F.3d 689, 692 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  
 224. Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 
(1st Cir. 2012) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2012)) (“A TMDL is a calculation of 
the maximum quantity of a pollutant that may be added to a water body from all sources 
without exceeding applicable water quality standards, including ‘a margin of safety which 
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent 
limitations and water quality.’ ”). The focus on enforcement of TMDLs is largely the result 
of citizen suits resulting in court decrees requiring the establishment of delinquent 
TMDLs. This example illustrates the need for policymakers engaged in regulatory design 
to consider how one aspect of a regulatory program (such as the availability of citizen 
enforcement) may affect other such aspects (such as the task of regulators to translate 
TMDLs into source-specific effluent limitations). 
 225. See, e.g., CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4252, CLEAN WATER 
ACT AND POLLUTANT TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMDLS) 9 (2012) (discussing 
the “resource-intensive” nature of TMDL implementation). 
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perhaps particularly great if the target is a vague narrative standard 
rather than a numerical limit.226 Determining whether a point source 
violated technology-based effluent limits, which are expressed as caps 
on end-of-pipe discharges, is a relatively simple matter by 
comparison. Agency efforts to improve water quality by restoring and 
maintaining ecologically functioning ecosystems will likely create 
similar ripple effects on enforcement strategies.227 Expansion of the 
CWA permit program to cover stormwater permitting may make 
regulators’ enforcement tasks more difficult because regulation of 
stormwater discharges often takes the form of best management 
practices rather than end-of-pipe discharge limits.228 It may be harder 
to track compliance status with mandates that take the form of 
ongoing operating practices than it is for numerical discharge limits 
that can be monitored.229 As regulatory challenges change, so do 
enforcement challenges, affecting the implications of available 
regulatory design options. 
Shifting from traditional regulatory techniques such as 
technology-based limits that apply to classes of regulated sources to 
market-based strategies that allow individual regulated entities to 
alter their responsibilities through inter-source transactions is another 
change in regulatory approach that is likely to create new 
enforcement challenges.230 Such a shift may make it more difficult to 
 
 226. The regulatory and non-regulatory enterprise of seeking to bring an impaired 
water up to a desired state is complex. Cf. Sarah Birkeland, Note, EPA’s TMDL Program, 
28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 300 (2001) (referring to “the implementation and enforcement 
challenges faced by the EPA’s TMDL program”). 
 227. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 550 (describing new objectives geared 
toward restoration and maintenance of functioning ecosystems and toward control of 
nonpoint source pollution). 
 228. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013). 
 229. See Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal Challenge of Protecting 
Animal Migrations as Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 223 (2010) 
(“BMPs are harder to monitor and enforce than traditional technology-based limitations 
because the BMPs are more widely dispersed across the landscape.”). 
 230. U.S. environmental law has long been criticized for excessive reliance on 
traditional regulatory techniques such as uniform technology-based standards applicable 
to source categories. The critics contend that such approaches are inefficient because they 
fail to recognize differences among sources in the costs of controlling pollution. See, e.g., 
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1333, 1333–34, 1355–56 (1985) (“[C]ompletely uniform goals are seriously 
dysfunctional, producing too much control in some regions, too little in others, and 
completely missing special problems in still other regions.”). Policymakers have responded 
by incorporating market-based mechanisms such as tradeable permits into statutes such as 
the CAA. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (2012) (allowing transfers of allowances for 
regulated utilities to emit sulfur dioxide that contributes to acid rain). 
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ascertain the nature and extent of enforceable duties of individual 
regulated entities.231 Some emissions trading markets have been 
exploited through the sale of credits for environmental improvements 
that would have occurred even without regulation, credits for which 
sellers have already been fully paid either in the same or another 
market or credits for environmental improvements that did not occur 
at all except on paper.232 Colorado noted that the burden on agencies 
to improve compliance may increase when requirements are tailored 
rather than consistent across an industry, not only because it will be 
more difficult for government inspectors to determine compliance, 
but also because “it may be more difficult to implement a self-
certification program where individualized permits determine unique 
facility-specific compliance requirements.”233 
A final development that may increase the difficulty of 
enforcement is the effort to address significant environmental threats, 
even from sources that have not traditionally been the focus of agency 
enforcement attention, and to address sources that are emitting or 
discharging relatively small amounts but whose violations may be 
cumulatively significant.234 If enforcement initiatives target smaller 
 
 231. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy 
Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006) (“[I]t is 
easier to keep track of a uniform technology than to police facility-specific pollution 
reduction strategies. Second generation strategies encourage differentiation. They 
accordingly offer less in the way of strict accountability and enforceability and open the 
door to bad-faith attempts to game the system.”). 
 232. See Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem 
Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 291–92 (2012). For descriptions of exploitations of 
environmental regulatory markets, see Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading 
and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 264 (1999) (describing the issuance by regulators of “hot 
air credits,” which are excess credits whose trading “represent[s] illusory environmental 
gains” and whose allocation “drives down the price of credits, reducing the motivation to 
invest in actual emission reductions or technological innovation”); Robert L. Glicksman, 
Regulatory Safeguards for Accountable Ecosystem Service Markets in Wetlands 
Development, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 943, 951–55 (2014) (providing three examples of 
manipulations of air pollution regulatory programs); Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. 
Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of a Harmful Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/incentive-to-slow-climate-change-
drives-output-of-harmful-gases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also Nicklas A. Akers, 
Note, New Tools for Environmental Justice: Articulating a Net Health Effects Challenge to 
Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203, 209 (2001) 
(discussing criticisms of emissions trading programs). 
 233. SCHIEFFELIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 18. 
 234. Cf. OIG, LIMITED KNOWLEDGE, supra note 214, at 14 (reporting that, in multiple 
program areas, “OECA does not know the cumulative effects of pollution from small 
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sources, enforcers may have to initiate more actions and commit more 
resources to enforcement just to achieve the same level of 
environmental improvement through enhanced compliance.235 In 
addition, data relevant to compliance status may not be available to 
the same extent for small as for larger sources, making it more 
difficult to enforce against those sources, or at least more expensive 
as agencies must amass a database that does not exist or is 
incomplete.236 
Not all changes in regulatory challenges make government 
officials’ jobs more difficult. There are also opportunities to promote 
compliance that may facilitate better performance. As Part III 
indicates, these include improvements in monitoring capacity and 
enhancements in the capacity to manage and disseminate data and 
other information. Improved understanding of the mix of incentives 
that promote compliance also holds promise for improving the 
effectiveness of enforcement efforts.237 
D. A Brief Conclusion Concerning the Importance of Context to 
Regulatory Design 
Part I seeks to demonstrate that policymakers designing or 
redesigning programs dealing with regulatory enforcement and 
compliance promotion should be aware that the programs operate in 
a multi-faceted context in which each part of the regulatory process 
may affect the degree to which other parts are capable of achieving 
the goal of effective regulation. Further, it highlights several 
contextual issues (such as the hybrid character of contemporary 
governance) that deserve close attention. This Part has focused on 
two contextual issues as they apply to EPA in particular. The first is 
the agency’s enforcement performance record and the impact on it of 
the resource challenges it has faced and continues to face. The second 
is the dynamic nature of regulation. Even if one were to take a 
 
entities”). The OIG also reported that “some states and EPA regions have argued that 
RCRA small quantity generator facility inspections represent some of the most 
environmentally significant activities that regions and States conduct.” Id.; see infra Part 
III. 
 235. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 
2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 560 (“The remaining non-compliance cases often involve either 
smaller targets or more difficult problems of proof, making them costlier and riskier to 
litigate.”). 
 236. See, e.g., OIG, LIMITED KNOWLEDGE, supra note 214, at 8 (discussing absence of 
reliable data on programs such as CAA regulation of minor stationary sources and 
regulation of small quantity generators under RCRA). 
 237. See infra Part III. 
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snapshot of the regulatory process and fully assimilate the 
interactions among the different phases of the regulatory process and 
actors participating in it, that understanding is of time-limited value. 
Past experience with a regulatory program can and should provide 
lessons that shape policymakers’ redesign efforts. Just as important, 
however, is recognition that the regulatory landscape and the role of 
its participants change, sometimes in ways that significantly disrupt 
settled patterns. If policymakers assume a certain level of state and 
private enforcement in structuring EPA’s own enforcement activities, 
they may find that the aggregate level of enforcement is not what they 
anticipated or desired if, for example, state funding of enforcement 
drops significantly. The same might be true if the Supreme Court 
were to issue a decision sharply restricting standing for environmental 
NGOs in citizen suits.238 The overarching point is that regulatory 
design needs to be undertaken and then revisited over time, with a 
sophisticated understanding of the nature of both the regulatory 
landscape that exists in a particular regulatory setting and of the 
changes in this landscape that are likely to occur over time. 
III.  A REVIEW OF EPA’S INITIATIVE TO “TRANSFORM” 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT239 
In this Part we provide a case study of an ongoing EPA 
regulatory redesign effort that EPA has recently undertaken to 
bolster compliance promotion strategies under the CWA. We 
examine EPA’s approach in the context of the holistic, contextual 
depiction of the enforcement and compliance promotion function 
outlined above. In doing so, we are mindful of the view some scholars 
 
 238. After the Supreme Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 
(1992), Professor Sunstein opined that “[r]ead for all it is worth, the decision invalidates” 
statutes in which Congress uses citizen suits to control “unlawfully inadequate 
enforcement of the law.” Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992). Had Sunstein’s expansive 
reading of the case been adopted by the courts after Lujan, one leg of the three-legged 
enforcement stool (the federal government, the states, and private citizens) would have 
been severely impaired. This example shows that yet another actor has the potential to 
affect operation of enforcement programs, including components designed to rationalize 
public and private enforcement—the federal courts, who act as “gatekeepers” of their own 
through the application of standing and other justiciability doctrines. 
 239. Transform is EPA’s word. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r, Enforcement & Compliance 
Assurance (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum from Adm’r Jackson], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/performance/cwa/jackson-ltr-cwa-enf.html. 
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have taken, which we have considered throughout the Article, that 
rationalizing public and private enforcement is a central challenge in 
the modern regulatory state.240 The absence of this consideration from 
EPA’s reinvention effort, despite EPA’s possession of agency 
gatekeeping authority and the significant level of private enforcer 
activity, raises important questions for conceptualizing and 
implementing strategies for enhancing enforcement and compliance 
promotion.241 
Over the past few years, EPA has acknowledged that its 
strategies for promoting compliance with the CWA need 
improvement.242 In a July 2009 Memorandum, EPA Administrator 
Lisa Jackson told the head of EPA’s enforcement program, Cynthia 
Giles, that “[w]e are . . . falling short . . . [in] the effectiveness of our 
clean water enforcement programs,”243 and “the level of significant 
 
 240. See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 3, at 616. 
 241. Our intent here is not to criticize EPA’s reinvention effort for its failure to address 
private enforcement, nor to criticize academic work highlighting the potential value of 
such enforcement in some contexts. EPA’s neglect of the topic may stem from its limited 
ability to control citizen enforcement initiatives or informational and coordination 
challenges, among other things. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: 
Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 
412–13, 428–45, 459–66 (2000) (expressing skepticism about government collaboration 
with private enforcers). The agency may block citizen suits by commencing and diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action against the target of a potential citizen suit within 
sixty days of being notified of a private enforcer’s intention to initiate suit. See, e.g., 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (2012). 
 242. Concerns pre-dated this latest EPA call for improvements. See Markell, supra 
note 1, at 4–12, 4 nn.11–14. See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5 
(identifying the potential value of cooperative and deterrence-based approaches to 
promote compliance). Efforts to enhance compliance have tended to focus on permit 
requirements for sources discharging pollutants to surface waters. One of EPA’s primary 
strategies is enforcement litigation against parties operating in “significant 
noncompliance” with permit obligations. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE & 
ENFORCEMENT ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S INTERIM SIGNIFICANT 
NONCOMPLIANCE POLICY FOR CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH 
CSOS, SSOS, CAFOS, AND STORM WATER POINT SOURCES 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/state/srf/sncpolicy-attach1.pdf. 
 243. Memorandum from Adm’r Jackson, supra note 239; see also EPA, CWAP, supra 
note 34, at 2 (“Unfortunately, data shows us that we are not getting the compliance 
envisioned by our laws to protect clean water.”); id. at 3 (“State enforcement response to 
serious violations, whether at large or smaller facilities, is not what it should be.”). The 
Action Plan adds: (1) traditionally EPA has focused on “major” facilities; (2) it has not 
required states to submit data about smaller facilities; and (3) therefore, EPA does not 
know the percentage of smaller sources nationally that are in significant compliance. Id. at 
2–3. For the twenty-eight states, four territories, and D.C., which have provided some of 
these data, the rate of significant noncompliance at smaller facilities is around forty-five 
percent, nearly twice the rate for major facilities. The Plan concludes that EPA and states 
need consistent data to “formulate appropriate strategies for ensuring compliance from 
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non-compliance with permitting requirements is unacceptably 
high . . . .”244 Jackson accordingly directed Giles to develop an action 
plan to improve enforcement performance.245 
In October 2009, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance (“OECA”) issued the Agency’s Clean Water Action Plan 
(“CWAP”).246 Echoing the Administrator’s concerns, OECA noted 
that “[v]iolations are . . . too widespread, and enforcement too 
uneven.”247 OECA also emphasized the challenge presented by a 
substantially increased universe of regulated parties: “The sheer 
magnitude of the expanding universe of the NPDES program itself, 
from roughly 100,000 . . . sources to nearly a million 
sources . . . presents challenges in how we regulate and enforce the 
laws . . . .”248 EPA noted that the types of sources known to raise 
concerns have evolved as well: When EPA developed its enforcement 
policies, it focused primarily on the largest (or major) facilities with 
individual permits that are in significant noncompliance. But EPA 
had found a rate of serious noncompliance at about forty-five percent 
of smaller facilities.249 EPA had further concluded that “[i]t is likely 
that these smaller but more numerous sources are of critical concern, 
especially where there are clusters of permitted facilities around 
impaired waters.”250 OECA stated that EPA needed to “revamp” 
enforcement to meet these challenges.251 
 
these facilities, and to target enforcement resources to the sources most affecting water 
quality.” Id. at 3. 
 244. Memorandum from Adm’r Jackson, supra note 239. 
 245. Id. 
 246. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34. 
 247. Id. at Executive Summary. 
 248. Id. at 1, 12 (noting that EPA’s CWA program has “expanded its regulated 
universe more than tenfold”). 
 249. Id. at 3. 
 250. Id. EPA acknowledged in the CWAP that “[w]ithout complete and accurate data, 
it is hard to know how critical the noncompliance at smaller facilities is to water quality.” 
Id. Professor Richard Pierce recognized decades ago that “[s]mall firms do not produce 
disproportionate quantities of social ‘goods.’ They do produce massively disproportionate 
quantities of social ‘bads.’ ” Pierce, supra note 2, at 539; see also id. at 557 (noting that 
“small firms account for a disproportionate quantity of the social bads that we attempt to 
reduce through regulation”); id. at 559 (“Small firms also are responsible for a massively 
disproportionate share of water and air pollution.”). Pierce addressed small firms, not 
necessarily small facilities, but EPA’s assessment in the CWAP indicates that similar 
conclusions may apply to small sources, especially when assessing the aggregate impacts of 
their discharges. See EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 3. 
 251. See EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at Executive Summary, 5. EPA noted that some 
water quality problems are caused by sources not currently being regulated. Id. at 6. Given 
our focus on regulatory design, not substantive regulatory content, we do not address the 
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Based on its own assessment, and considerable outreach,252 
OECA identified “three major themes for action” to improve 
compliance, noting that its outreach efforts engendered a 
“surprising . . . coalescence” around these themes.253 The three 
themes, discussed below, are the need to focus on the most significant 
threats to water quality and public health, to strengthen EPA-state 
partnerships and improve the performance of each partner, and to 
improve accountability and transparency. 
A. The Need to Focus Enforcement on the Most Significant Threats 
The first theme for action identified in the CWAP is the need to 
focus enforcement on the “biggest threats to water quality and public 
health.”254 This strategy, or approach to regulatory design, might seem 
obvious. But as EPA pointed out, an unintended consequence of 
EPA’s traditional focus on the biggest facilities (known in EPA 
parlance as “majors”) was that EPA paid little attention to the “full 
range of the NPDES regulated universe,”255 including “non-major” 
sources whose discharges caused significant environmental problems. 
Thus, EPA’s first theme seeks to prioritize enforcement-related 
efforts by ensuring that these efforts focus on the most problematic 
sources regardless of size, which previously it had not done. 
 
need to revisit the scope of regulatory schemes (such as by covering nonpoint sources 
currently exempt from most CWA regulation). For discussion of the need for greater 
control of nonpoint sources under the CWA, see Adler, supra note 18, at 158–62. See also 
Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the 
Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control 
Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 132–33 (2010) (describing the continuing impact 
of nonpoint source pollution). 
 252. Outreach included solicitation of input from academics, industry, and 
environmental and environmental justice NGOs. See EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 5. 
 253. Id. at 6. EPA has followed through since 2009. See, e.g., Memorandum from 
Cynthia Giles, Office of Enforcement & Compliance, Envtl. Prot. Agency and Peter Silva, 
Office of Water, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Officers, Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (June 22, 
2010), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/interim-guid-
npdes-062210.pdf (implementing actions set forth in the CWAP); see also OFFICE OF 
ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CWA ACTION 
PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PRIORITIES: CHANGES TO IMPROVE WATER QUALITY, 
INCREASE COMPLIANCE AND EXPAND TRANSPARENCY 2–3 (2011) [hereinafter 
INCREASED COMPLIANCE], available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files 
/documents/cwa-action-plan-implementation-priorities-may-2011.pdf (“[P]resent[ing] four 
key changes needed for the revamped NPDES program . . . .”). 
 254. See EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 6. 
 255. Id. 
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EPA identified a range of “new approaches and new tools” to 
address its proposed shift in strategy.256 For example, it noted the 
need to improve data management to facilitate understanding of the 
relationship between compliance problems and their impacts on 
water quality.257 Data about water quality, permit limits, and permit 
violations “reside in different systems and have not been routinely 
used together to help target serious problems.”258 EPA also 
highlighted the importance of improving tools across the spectrum of 
regulation, indicating that while responses might include enforcement 
actions, addressing water quality concerns also might require fixing 
problematic regulations and improving operating permits.259 Last, the 
agency focused on integrating its state partners better in its discussion 
about options for addressing the “biggest threats.”260 
In short, EPA’s strategy in addressing the first significant 
deficiency it identified in extant compliance promotion efforts 
involved all four of the contextual design issues we identified above. 
EPA’s goal of better integrating states into its enforcement initiatives 
reflects the hybrid nature of the regulatory process—our first 
conceptual design challenge. The agency’s decision to refocus its 
efforts stemmed from the “reality check” provided by past experience 
—our second contextual design challenge—which showed that 
historically EPA had paid insufficient attention to significant violators 
by focusing on a small subset of the regulated party universe. EPA’s 
 
 256. See id. at 7. EPA discussed several new tools in a 2011 memorandum. INCREASED 
COMPLIANCE, supra note 253, at 4–14. 
 257. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that “[o]nce we have identified 
significant point source violations across the spectrum of regulated facilities that adversely 
affect water quality, we will work with state programs to commence appropriate federal 
and state civil and criminal enforcement actions”). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 6–7. For example, OECA has indicated its receptivity to allowing states 
to scale back inspections and monitoring at large facilities to free up resources for more 
intensive scrutiny at smaller facilities, where compliance rates are lower. Reflecting the 
complexity of the cooperative federalism approach, however, another recent report 
indicates that while states are ready to refocus their efforts, some EPA regional offices 
have expressed less willingness to allow shifts in enforcement-related resources from large 
facilities to higher priority smaller ones. See Lee Logan, EPA Plan for Flexible 
Compliance Monitoring May Fall Short of States’ Goal, INSIDE EPA 21 (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://environmentalnewsstand.com/newsstand-login?n=169008&destination=node/169008 
(noting that “some state officials said EPA regional officials do not appear open 
to . . . scaling back resource-intensive inspections at large facilities with typically good 
compliance records in exchange for more inspections at smaller, less-reviewed plants”) 
(subscription required). This divergence in view stems from the hybrid nature of the 
regulatory process (which entails both federal and state enforcement). 
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commitment to take advantage of improved technology to make 
easily accessible and understandable information available to the 
public about compliance status, actions EPA and states are taking to 
address problems, and the effects of those actions on water quality261 
relates to our third contextual design challenge—dynamism. Finally, 
EPA’s decision to shift its priorities reflects an agency effort to 
grapple with our fourth design issue—salience. Further, by focusing 
on resolving data deficiencies (verifiability) and tools besides formal 
enforcement (the available mix of rewards and sanctions), EPA 
considered some of the key components of an effective enforcement 
and compliance program identified in Part I.A. The Agency also 
recognized the interrelated character of these components, noting, for 
example, that improved verifiability and better use of sanctions are 
related. 
B. Strengthening the EPA-State Partnership 
The second “major theme for action” that EPA identified in its 
CWAP, not entirely distinct from the first, is the need to strengthen 
state performance. In most parts of the country, states are the first 
line of CWA permitting and enforcement.262 The Plan noted that 
reviews of state performance identified widespread deficiencies, and 
EPA noted the importance of federal oversight to motivate 
improvements in such performance: 
[The many reviews of state permitting and enforcement 
performance] have identified a lack of consistency in 
performance across states and highlighted common issues such 
as permit backlogs, failure to identify significant 
noncompliance, or to take timely and appropriate enforcement. 
EPA must consistently respond to these issues and press states 
and ourselves to make the appropriate improvements in order 
to achieve equitable protection to the public, a level playing 
field for competing businesses, and fairness across states in how 
our environmental laws are enforced.263 
 
 261. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 7. 
 262. Forty-six states are currently authorized to implement the NPDES program. Id. at 
8. 
 263. Id. These concerns are not new. One observer rendered this assessment twenty 
years ago: “Enforcement of environmental laws by the EPA and the authorized states, 
however, has largely been an uncoordinated, piecemeal effort. Individual EPA offices and 
their state counterparts have generally functioned independently. . . . The insularity of the 
EPA’s separate offices and their state-level counterparts has at times resulted in duplicate 
and conflicting actions.” Peter J. Fontaine, EPA’s Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The 
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EPA’s goal of better integration of federal and state enforcement 
involves the first of our contextual design challenges—the idea that 
design efforts should take into account the role of different 
stakeholders in a hybrid regulatory process. Particularly in the 
cooperative federalism context built into the environmental statutes, 
it is unsurprising that EPA would make rationalization of its 
relationship with the states a top priority.264 EPA enforcement leaders 
over the past couple of decades have highlighted the importance of 
the state-federal partnership in effective enforcement and compliance 
promotion.265 
EPA’s focus in the CWAP on rationalizing federal and state 
enforcement efforts reflects more than just our point about the 
importance of hybrid governance considerations to regulatory design. 
EPA’s concerns extend to several of the key elements of effective 
enforcement and compliance promotion we discuss above, including 
verifiability and the appropriate mix of rewards and sanctions. The 
fact that EPA decided to directly and publicly level its criticisms of 
state performance implicates legitimacy concerns, another important 
element of effective regulation. EPA’s decision to pursue improved 
enforcement in light of unacceptable past performance reflects the 
importance of the “contextual design” issue of structuring future 
efforts in light of assessments of past performance. The agency’s 
apparent decision to regard rationalization of federal and state 
enforcement as a higher priority than the rationalization of public and 
private enforcement implicates another of our contextual design 
issues (salience).266 Thus, EPA’s goal of strengthening state 
 
Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 34–35 
(1993). For book-length treatment, see generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra 
note 5. See also Markell, supra note 29, at 25–28, 27 n.119 (discussing EPA’s inconsistent 
oversight between regions). For a recent review of an innovative process intended to 
empower citizens to raise such concerns administratively, see generally Hammond & 
Markell, supra note 5. 
 264. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 195 (2005) (referring to coordination between federal and 
state entities as “an irreducible aspect” of cooperative federalism); Hari M. Osofsky, 
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 
ALA. L. REV. 237, 285 (2011) (discussing cooperative federalism’s potential to “create 
coordinated multiscalar action in which each actor provides its unique contribution”). 
 265. See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5 (discussing the views 
of EPA officials and others concerning the central importance of the state and federal 
relationship in environmental enforcement). 
 266. It is not clear from the CWAP whether EPA actually considered the role of 
private enforcement at all in this particular redesign effort. The Plan makes no reference 
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performance bears on several elements of our conceptual framework 
for improving regulatory design. 
C. Improving Accountability and Transparency 
The third theme around which EPA and its stakeholders 
coalesced in the CWAP is the need to improve accountability and 
transparency.267 As it did in identifying the Plan’s first two themes, 
EPA acknowledged that it “lacks nationally consistent and complete 
information on the facilities, permits, pollutant discharges and 
compliance status of most NPDES-regulated facilities.”268 Data 
problems exist across the board, including “data quality, accuracy, 
and completeness.”269 Inevitably, the infrastructure problem these 
data gaps represent “affects the ability of EPA and states to identify 
violations, . . . connect violations to water quality impacts, and to 
share information with the public.”270 The Plan notes that the 
“breadth and expanding scope of the NPDES regulated universe” 
heightens the challenge of responding to the long-standing data 
problems.271 The CWAP indicates that, because of the size of the 
challenge and the costs involved (it would cost over $100 million per 
year to generate the data EPA would like to have),272 EPA will 
explore new ways to fill these data gaps, including using technological 
advances.273 
Innovative information-gathering technologies may facilitate the 
ability of regulators and potential private enforcers to identify 
regulatory violations. Geographic information systems, global 
positioning satellite technologies, and remote sensing devices already 
support the investigation and enforcement of environmental laws in 
 
to the appropriate role of private enforcers or to how they impact public enforcement or 
desired levels of compliance. 
 267. Thus, this theme relates directly to the third and fifth components of effective 
regulation described in Part I.A, verifiability and legitimacy. 
 268. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 10. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,006, 46,080, 46,082 
(proposed July 30, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 127, 403, 501, 503) 
(proposing rulemaking to require electronic reporting to address quality, accuracy, 
completeness, and timeliness concerns associated with its data); Christian Latham, 
Digitizing Environmental Protection, REGBLOG (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.regblog.org 
/2013/12/05-latham-digitizing-environmental-protection.html (discussing the capacity of 
the proposed rule to enhance enforcement under the CWA against smaller facilities such 
as stormwater dischargers). 
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ways that were not previously possible.274 Some of this technology is 
available to the public at little or no cost from federal or state 
agencies.275 These technologies produce data that are more finely 
grained and that can be more helpful in identifying environmental 
conditions, violations, and violators than cruder, previously available 
data. The new data can strengthen the deterrent impact of regulations 
and foster higher compliance levels if regulated entities recognize that 
ease of access to information may make it easier for enforcers to 
prove violations.276 
Invoking the experience with the TRI program, the CWAP also 
touts the promise of transparency as a tool to improve compliance.277 
 
 274. See Peter Stokely, Using Aerial Photography, Geospatial Data, and GIS to Support 
the Enforcement of Environmental Statutes, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2013, at 
38–40. Remote sensing is “the science and art of obtaining information about an object, 
area, or phenomenon through the analysis of data acquired by a device not in contact with 
the object, area, or phenomenon under investigation.” Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal 
Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital 
Information As Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 219, 221 (2002) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Dave Owen, “increased data 
availability, new software systems, and exponentially greater computing power have 
combined to turn spatial analysis—that is, quantitative analysis of data coded to specific 
geographic coordinates—into the coin of the environmental realm.” Dave Owen, 
Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 
219, 222. Owen suggests that “[t]he emergence of spatial analysis merits revisiting 
environmental law’s traditional debates about integrative, holistic decisionmaking,” 
although he refers to geographic and temporal rather than process-oriented fragmentation 
and does not address the implications of spatial analysis for enforcement. Id. at 223. 
 275. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 115, 156–57 (2004) (noting that new technologies may “provide on-the-ground 
monitoring of environmental conditions from anywhere, at any time, at increasingly low 
cost,” revolutionizing responses to environmental problems); see also Grabosky, supra 
note 95, at 118 (noting the potential for digital technology to “assist in labor-intensive 
investigation of non-compliance”). 
 276. Markowitz, supra note 274, at 228–29. Earlier iterations of improved data 
collection technologies have had that effect. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Enforcing 
Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of Two Programs, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 4–8 
(2010) (describing how continuous emissions monitoring equipment and automatic 
verification systems bolstered compliance levels under the CAA’s acid rain program). 
 277. The TRI program was created by section 313 of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728, 1741 (1986) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2012)). It requires facilities that manufacture, process, or use listed 
toxic chemicals in amounts that exceed threshold quantities to submit to EPA and state 
officials toxic chemical release forms. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (2012). This information is 
meant to inform persons about toxic chemical releases, assist research and data gathering, 
and aid in the development of appropriate regulations. Id. § 11023(h). The TRI program 
may not be an ideal model for improving transparency and verifiability. See, e.g., M.B. 
Pell, Ryan McNeill & Selam Gebrekidan, U.S. System for Flagging Hazardous Chemicals 
Is Widely Flawed, REUTERS, July 8, 2013, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/ 
environmentNews/idUSBRE9670K720130708 (describing investigation concluding that 
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EPA suggests that both public pressure and greater regulated party 
self-awareness can motivate better performance. For our purposes, 
the key point is that, in identifying strategies to improve compliance, 
EPA is looking well beyond ex post enforcement and considering a 
range of tools throughout the regulatory process. In doing so, it is by 
no means dismissing the value of traditional enforcement; it is simply 
calling for use of additional tools to address compliance challenges, a 
position we have taken in previous work278 and which academic 
literature supports.279 According to EPA, “[t]ransparency is not a 
replacement for regulatory enforcement, but can be an effective 
driver for improved performance and accountability.”280 As others 
have noted, changes in information technology can affect phases of 
the regulatory process other than ex post enforcement. Better 
information, for example, can contribute to the adoption of more 
effective regulation, planning, and permitting, which in turn can affect 
the extent of compliance and the need for enforcement.281 
The CWAP’s third theme illustrates how considerations relating 
to hybrid governance and the dynamic nature of the regulatory 
environment can affect regulatory design choices, and that these 
aspects of regulatory design may affect key characteristics of effective 
regulation, including verifiability, the creation of appropriate 
compliance incentives, and regulatory legitimacy. The range and 
relative attractiveness of regulatory design options, both for 
regulation as a whole and for enforcement aspects of it, will shift over 
time as technology advances, government capacity evolves in other 
ways, and more is learned about what works and what does not in 
achieving desired environmental results. Regulatory design decisions 
should take full account of these contextual aspects of regulation. 
 
the TRI program is plagued by scant government oversight and by incomplete or 
inaccurate reporting by regulated entities, and charging that EPA and most states “make 
no effort to verify the [reported] data”). 
 278. See generally Markell, supra note 1 (discussing the value of different approaches 
to promote compliance). Cf. Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Relative 
Efficacy of Coercive and Cooperative Enforcement Approaches to Water Pollution Control, 
in NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE, supra note 17, at 79, 79–89 (discussing deterrence-
based, cooperative, and “responsive” regulatory approaches).  
 279. Cf. GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3 (discussing the value of 
different strategies); NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE, supra note 17 (discussing “new 
tools available to make compliance and enforcement more effective”).  
 280. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at 10. 
 281. See, e.g., Robert Thomason, More Data from Environmental Monitoring Now 
Supports Environmental Policy, Rules, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 191–92 (Jan. 17, 
2014) (discussing the impacts of scientific sensing equipment on programs to enhance 
water quality in the Chesapeake Bay). 
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D. Enhancing Reinvention Through Holistic Regulatory Evaluation 
While EPA’s effort to improve enforcement and compliance 
efforts under the CWAP reflect many of the aspects of our multi-
layered approach to regulatory design, the application of our 
framework to the initiative raises questions about several features of 
the CWAP. In this section, we provide a few examples of how a more 
complete accounting of all of the layers of our model for the design of 
regulatory enforcement and compliance programs might enrich 
EPA’s analysis of each element of its CWAP.282 
The first theme of EPA’s CWAP centers on expanding the range 
of enforcement efforts to cover regulated sources previously ignored 
or deemphasized.283 EPA reasons that the discharges of small sources, 
particularly in the aggregate, have the potential to create significant 
adverse public health and environmental effects.284 Implicit in EPA’s 
decision to sweep these sources into the agency’s enforcement 
program is that doing so should increase the prospects of achieving 
desired levels of water quality. EPA may well prove to be correct, and 
as a normative matter we hope so. 
Conceptually, we encourage systematic consideration of the role 
our five key components of effective enforcement and compliance 
might play a part of this new initiative. For example, are there 
strategies that would improve the regulated community’s 
understanding of its regulatory obligations and how to meet them, as 
Colorado did with hazardous waste small quantity generators (our 
clarity component)?285 Smaller facilities are less likely than larger 
counterparts to have access to sophisticated technical and legal 
advice.286 EPA has undertaken such outreach in other settings.287 
 
 282. These examples are intended to be illustrative of the value of using a conceptual 
framework of the sort we propose in this Article in considering reforms to the 
enforcement and compliance promotion function, rather than to serve as a comprehensive 
assessment of options to enhance the CWAP. 
 283. EPA, CWAP, supra note 34, at Executive Summary. 
 284. See id. at 3, 12. 
 285. See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
 286. Cf. Lisa Spagnolo, Rats in the Kaleidoscope: Rationality, Irrationality, and the 
Economics and Psychology of Opting In and Out of the CISG (Kaleidoscope Part II), 13 
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARBITRATION 157, 159 (2009) (“As legal advice is a 
form of information cost, small-medium businesses face proportionately higher 
information costs, and are therefore more prone to imperfectly informed decision making 
and concurrent efficiency losses from less-suitable choices of law.”). 
 287. EPA’s website on Compliance Assistance provides access to many such outreach 
initiatives. See Compliance Assistance, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/assistance/ (last updated June 20, 2012). 
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Similarly, what are the implications of achievability for EPA’s 
enforcement strategies for smaller facilities? Are there steps EPA can 
and should take in light of any achievability issues that are likely to 
materialize with respect to smaller facilities in particular? Verifiability 
is a third component that deserves careful consideration in 
determining how best to regulate a large universe of smaller facilities. 
Are there additional steps EPA should consider to facilitate effective 
self-monitoring? Or actions that could facilitate more effective 
government (EPA or state) monitoring and reporting? NGO capacity 
to participate in the verifiability component is worth attention as well. 
Our fourth and fifth components—the mix of rewards and 
sanctions, and legitimacy—should influence when EPA brings cases 
against large and small facilities, and the relief the agency should 
seek. Perceptions of legitimacy may increase, for example, if EPA’s 
enforcement program targets all suspected significant violators, 
regardless of size, particularly if small sources create adverse effects 
analogous to those resulting from discharges by larger facilities. On 
the other hand, coercive enforcement against small entities may seem 
unfair and overbearing to those sources if they lack adequate 
resources to comply, or if they lack the technical capacity to identify 
and quickly resolve problems. EPA policies account for disparities in 
the regulated community in terms of ability to pay;288 applying these 
fourth and fifth commitments, it would be appropriate for the agency 
to consider proactively whether other special accommodations are 
appropriate in deciding which suits to initiate and what relief to seek. 
Our framework also suggests the value of deepening, or perhaps 
extending, the analysis of EPA’s commitment in the second element 
of its plan to achieving a better integration of federal and state 
enforcement efforts. EPA’s Plan does not address the role of citizen 
suits (an important aspect of hybrid governance in the enforcement 
and compliance promotion arena) in addressing the shortcomings it 
identified. The availability of citizen suits complicates the challenges 
of rationalizing or integrating federal and state compliance 
inducement efforts because such suits make it possible for three 
enforcers with different interests and capacities to take steps to 
address particular alleged violations. The challenges, and 
 
 288. See Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Adm’r, Office of 
Enforcement & Compliance, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Assistant Adm’rs & Reg’l Adm’rs, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Dec. 16, 1986), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/documents/civilpenalty-violators.pdf (“Guidance on Determining a 
Violator’s Ability to Pay a Civil Penalty”). 
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opportunities, are significant because of the significant number of 
actions citizen enforcers bring each year.289 Public enforcers have 
considerable discretionary authority over the fate of private 
enforcement; to use Professor Engstrom’s phrase, the major federal 
pollution control statutes empower EPA and the states to serve as 
“gatekeepers” with respect to citizen suits.290 
Nevertheless, there are significant limits on EPA’s ability to 
influence citizen suit enforcers. A fully integrated analysis of the role 
of public enforcement by federal and state authorities should include 
an assessment of strategies that would “rationalize” the use of citizen 
suits so that, in combination, the three sets of enforcers have the best 
chance of halting significant violations and inducing desired levels of 
compliance.291 For example, weak gatekeeping is likely to create 
uncertainty for regulated entities (regarding the likelihood of suit, the 
types of relief to be sought, etc.). But strong gatekeeping that 
significantly disables private enforcement may detract from the 
legitimacy of the regulatory program if it is perceived as an effort by 
captured regulators to block public participation in efforts to halt 
violations with significant public health or environmental 
implications. While, therefore, we respectfully suggest that Professor 
Engstrom’s prescriptions for rationalizing public and private 
enforcement would benefit from consideration of state enforcement, 
EPA’s CWAP is similarly incomplete because it ignores the role of 
private enforcement. A comprehensive effort to design an 
enforcement and compliance regime that is up to the challenges of 
hybrid governance needs to take account, at a minimum, of the roles 
of all three enforcers, of how regulated entities are likely to react to 
the enforcement strategies of each, and of how each enforcer’s 
effectiveness will be affected by the actions of the other two 
enforcers. 
The CWAP’s failure to consider the role of private enforcers in 
the CWA’s hybrid enforcement program similarly may prevent the 
 
 289. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 129, 241 and accompanying text. 
 291. For previous inquiries into the relationship between public and private 
enforcement in the context of citizen suit enforcement, see, for example, Jeffrey G. Miller, 
Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental 
Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit 
Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401 (2004); Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations 
in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA 
and Citizens, Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on EPA Enforcement, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (2005). 
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third aspect of EPA’s CWAP—reliance on new information 
technology to enhance accountability and transparency—from 
completely fulfilling its potential. The dynamic nature of changes in 
information technology means that the economics, feasibility, and 
chances for success of enforcement will not remain static. Better 
monitoring and the information it generates, for example, may 
motivate regulated parties not to violate the law in the first place, 
thereby influencing the universe of cases that deserve formal 
enforcement. Better monitoring and information might heighten the 
willingness of private enforcers to pursue violators as information 
gathering costs decrease and the costs of success rise. These 
developments may spur citizen suits that would not otherwise have 
been brought, adding to the chances that regulatory policy will be set 
in the context of private litigation in ways which the government 
deems unwise.292 
When Congress enacted the major federal environmental 
regulatory statutes, it chose to forego a uniform enforcement regime 
in which expert federal agencies have the sole power to decide which 
enforcement actions will promote legislative goals. Instead, Congress 
created a regime in which EPA shares its enforcement authority with 
states, in part for reasons rooted in a desire to promote federalism 
values. In addition, as Professor Engstrom has noted, when Congress 
created citizen suit provisions, it took into account and implicitly 
endorsed enforcement actions by private litigants that public 
enforcers might choose not to pursue, thereby “conferring democratic 
legitimacy, though at a higher level of generality,” on such 
enforcement pursuits.293 In other words, Congress intended that EPA 
and the states share authority with private enforcers, whose inclusion 
in the enforcement equation arguably promotes legitimacy in addition 
to reflecting Congress’s intent to align enforcement capacity with 
levels of noncompliance warranting enforcement action in light of 
government resource constraints. These considerations are all 
relevant to policymakers as they consider the likely impacts of 
improved information technology on the preferred structure of 
enforcement and compliance programs. 
 
 292. This concern has obtained traction with some Supreme Court justices. See, e.g., 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A Clean Water Act plaintiff pursuing civil penalties acts as a self-
appointed mini-EPA.”). 
 293. Engstrom, supra note 3, at 638. 
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CONCLUSION 
Enforcement is generally thought to be an indispensable feature 
of effective governance. The importance of using a holistic and 
systematic approach to consider reforms to agencies’ enforcement 
and compliance functions is difficult to overstate because of the 
interconnectedness of the different components of an effective 
regulatory regime. Yet much of the discussion of options to improve 
enforcement fails to account for the entirety of the administrative 
state’s tools to conduct its work. 
This Article offers a comprehensive conceptual framework for 
considering how best to structure an enforcement and compliance 
promotion regime. The framework includes three levels. The first 
identifies five key components of effective regulation: clarity, 
achievability, verifiability, the mix of rewards and sanctions, and 
legitimacy. The second deals with interactions among the five 
components, which in some instances may produce synergistic 
benefits, but in others may require policymakers to make tradeoffs 
and difficult choices. The third level is comprised of four contextual 
design challenges facing regulatory programs, including enforcement 
regimes: hybrid governance, past performance, dynamism, and 
salience. Agencies should confront each of these challenges in 
designing and administering enforcement and compliance promotion 
efforts. The “test run” we gave to the framework by applying it to a 
case study of an ongoing EPA effort to transform its enforcement 
strategies under the Clean Water Act illustrates the importance of 
efforts of this sort to use a wide lens in considering regulatory design 
and implementation opportunities. 
